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Introduction
Several studies contend that humans are the weakest link in computer security, given that
humans often engage in non-secure computer practices with non-malicious intentions.
(Bulgurcu, Cavusoglu, & Benbasat, 2010; Chen, Ramamurthy, & Wen, 2012; D'Arcy & Hovav,
2007; Sasse, Brostoff, & Weirich, 2001). Non-malicious security violations (NMSVs) such as
failure to recognize phishing emails, use of weak passwords, development of non-secure
program code, and failure to comply with computer security policies, all pose a threat to
computer security in the form of human error (Guo, Yuan, Archer, & Connelly, 2011; Willison
& Warkentin, 2013). A recent report by IBM (2014) contends that more than 95% of computer
security incidents include some aspect of human error, while a recent report by PwC (2015)
states that human error contributed to 50% of the single worst data breaches in 2015, an increase
of 31% over the previous year. NMSVs are acknowledged to represent human behavior separate
from that predicated by malicious intent, with individuals engaged in malicious human behavior
sometimes referred to as hackers, bad actors or malicious insiders (Wang, Gupta, & Rao, 2015),
Given the modern day need for organizations to maintain uninterrupted access to information
systems (IS) to achieve organizational objectives, human error represents a reverse salient within
computer security defense-in-depth architectures due to the vulnerability it creates (Acuña, 2016;
Dedehayir & Mäkinen, 2011; Guo et al., 2011; Hughes, 1983).

As a countermeasure to the vulnerability of human error in computer security, some studies
contend that developing and maintaining a culture of computer security is essential for managing
the human, or behavioral aspect of computer security (Da Veiga & Eloff, 2007; Dhillon, Syed, &
Pedron, 2016; van Niekerk & von Solms, 2010; B. von Solms, 2000). Schein (2004) confirms
this contention by stating that culture is an abstraction, and that organizations need to understand
the forces that result from social and organizational situations, lest they fall victim to them.

One aspect of computer security culture is human compliance with computer security policy
(Thomson & von Solms, 2005). Several studies have published findings on the effects of a
computer security policy on computer security culture and compliance with computer security
policy. Da Veiga and Eloff (2007) contend that a culture of computer security is developed
through actions taken by an organization, and that these actions include the implementation and
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governance of information security policies. D’Arcy & Hovav (2007) posit that a culture of
computer security that encourages compliance with security policies, user security awareness,
and attention to security issues, will help reduce information system misuse in the workplace.
Knapp, Marshall, Rainer, & Ford (2006) contend that support from top management positively
impacts computer security culture and policy enforcement. Bulgurcu et al. (2010), along with
Safa, von Solms, & Furnell (2016), contend that information security awareness can positively
influence individual beliefs regarding computer security policies, suggesting that creation of a
computer security culture improves computer security. Conversely, Y. Chen, Ramamurthy, &
Wen (2015) contend that just being aware of a computer security policy contributes little to
computer security culture, while

Y. Chen et al. (2012) posit that employees require both

positive and negative reinforcement to follow security policies and procedures in order to
produce desired human behavior.

Thus, it is a premise of this study that human compliance with computer security policy is an
element of computer security culture that contributes to managing the human aspect of computer
security (S. H. von Solms, 2005). For this to be true, it is posited that an enterprise must have an
overarching computer security policy that is comprehensive in scope and ownership, against
which all impacted humans can be held compliant. However, no studies have been found that
explain the impact of a comprehensive computer security policy on human computer security
compliance through an understanding of its direct or indirect effects.

For purpose of this study, a comprehensive computer security policy is defined as a top-level
enterprise policy incorporating all aspects of enterprise computer security encompassing
information technology (IT) computer security and operational technology (OT) computer
security, as opposed to only one domain or the other. The concept of merging IT computer
security which is focused on information systems security, with that of OT computer security
which is focused on industrial control systems security, is sometimes referred to as IT/OT
convergence and reflects a holistic approach to managing enterprise computer security (ISACA,
2016). This definition of a comprehensive computer security policy differs from the traditional
definition of a computer security policy that only includes aspects of a computer security
program from the IT domain, as this definition also includes all aspects of a computer security
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program from the OT domain. As such, a comprehensive computer security policy encompasses
all enterprise aspects of computer security thereby incorporating enterprise scope and ownership
of computer security into a single, overarching policy that binds all humans in the enterprise to a
common cause. In doing so, the issue of human error is addressed through human compliance
with a shared, comprehensive computer security policy which in turn is aligned with Schein’s
(2004) formal definition of organizational culture; “a pattern of shared basic assumptions that
was learned by a group as it solved its problems of external adaptation and internal integration,
that has worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members
as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems.”

It is the comprehensive nature of the computer security policy that separates this study from
similar studies in this research domain.

Therefore, it is the thesis of this study that a

comprehensive computer security policy has a direct effect on human compliance with computer
security policy, which can be further explained through indirect effects.

Motivation
It is not well known how a comprehensive computer security policy effects human compliance
with computer security policy, as a literature review resulted in no studies found on this topic.
This finding represents a gap in IS literature, as any computer security policy to which humans
are held accountable should be explainable in regard to the factors that influence human
compliance with that policy. This finding provides the motivation for this study.

It is a premise of this study that human compliance with computer security policy is an element
of computer security culture that contributes to managing the human, or behavioral aspect of
computer security.

In addition, it is posited that such a policy must be overarching and

comprehensive in terms of scope and ownership, against which all impacted humans can be held
compliant. As defined by this study, a computer security policy must be comprehensive in scope
in order to have a meaningful effect on human compliance with computer security policy. This
study defines a comprehensive computer security policy as a top-level policy incorporating all
aspects of computer security including research, control selection, tool selection, monitoring,
incident response, and training and awareness practices from both the IT and OT domains. A
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logical reference to the distinction between the IT domain and the OT domain is that described
by the Reference Model for Computer Integrated Manufacturing (CIM), wherein the separation
between the IT domain and the OT domain can be paraphrased as the point of demarcation
between computer decision support systems leveraged by humans (IT), and computer industrial
control systems that make control decisions autonomously (OT)

(CIM Reference Model

Committee International Purdue Workshop on Industrial Computer Systems, 1989).
Recognition of this distinction, and the effect of joining both domains into a comprehensive
computer security policy, is critical to understanding the premise of this thesis.

Enterprise computer risk is not limited to the computing infrastructure situated in the IT domain
alone. Enterprise computer risk exists in the OT domain as well and is growing, due to the
expanding presence of computers being embedded in devices beyond the IT desktop computer
and IT laptop computer. Computing technology is rapidly becoming embedded in modern
electronic devices such as cell phones, tablets, navigation devices, wearable gadgets, and
industrial control components, thereby increasing enterprise vulnerability to modern computer
threats (US-CERT Publications, 2015). The recent realization of the Internet, the World Wide
Web, and the Internet of Things (IoT) has enabled the introduction of a new era of computer
threats that are unprecedented in scale and scope, and continue to show signs of rapid evolution.

Labeled variously as the IoT, the industrial Internet of Things (IIoT), or simply embedded
systems, the IoT has been identified by the National Intelligence Council as one of six disruptive
technologies with the power to spread IT risk far more widely than the Internet has to date
(National Intelligence Council, 2008). Thus, a computer security policy encompassing enterprise
IT and enterprise OT establishes the foundation for a holistic, or comprehensive scope of
enterprise computer security culture.

As defined by this study, a computer security policy must be comprehensive in ownership in
order to have a meaningful effect on human compliance with computer security policy. This
study defines comprehensive ownership as clear accountability for an overarching computer
security policy, with the ability to delegate responsibility as deemed necessary. Clearly defined
ownership at the top of the organization sets the tone for developing and maintaining a
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comprehensive culture of computer security across an enterprise. Clearly defined ownership sets
the foundation for enterprise computer security by recognizing the difference between IT and
OT, which in turn establishes the foundation for a comprehensive computer security policy.
Every human in the enterprise is responsible for computer security regardless of whether their
assigned role aligns more closely with IT than OT, or vice versa. This distinction must be
recognized by a top-level policy for persistence of a comprehensive computer security culture,
which in turn contributes to human compliance with computer security policy.

Thus, this research is both novel and timely in its intent to better understand the factors that
influence human compliance with a comprehensive computer security policy.

This research is novel in that no peer reviewed research was found that explained the direct
effect of a comprehensive computer security policy on human computer security compliance
through an understanding of its indirect effects. To investigate this finding, this study draws on
the theory of planned behavior (TPB) to understand human intent to comply with a
comprehensive computer security policy. TPB is widely used in IS literature to explain human
behavior through the factors that influence human intent, and is one of the most widely cited
theoretical frameworks in IS literature on user technology acceptance (Dinev & Hu, 2007).
Defined by Ajzen (1991), TPB states that human behavior is determined by factors that influence
the intention to perform a specific behavior. Rather than model specific human behavior, TPB
models the behavioral intention of humans. The stronger the intention to perform the behavior,
the more likely it is that the specific behavior will be performed. The research model for this
study contributes to novel IS theory in the form of TPB antecedent constructs to explain the
effects of a comprehensive computer security policy on intention to comply.

This research is timely in that modern computer threats and computer vulnerabilities, sometimes
referred to as cybersecurity, are evolving rapidly and are capable of introducing significant
computer risk to an organization (D'Arcy & Hovav, 2007; National Intelligence Council, 2008;
U.S. Government, 2011; U.S. PPD-41, 2016; UK Government, 2016).

While the extant

literature includes research on the implications of cybersecurity threat in the IT domain (Acuña,
2016), the implications of cybersecurity threat in the OT domain have yet to be fully explored
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and understood (ISACA, 2016; Volz & Finkle, 2016; R. von Solms & van Niekerk, 2013; Zetter,
2012, 2014, 2015a, 2015b). In addition to the descriptive or behavioral findings resulting from
this study, the research model for this study contributes to IS practice in the form of the
prescriptive power of a comprehensive computer security policy to bind organizational
constituents to a common cause.

Thus, research that contributes to a better understanding of the theoretical and practical factors
that influence human intent to comply with a comprehensive computer security policy represents
research that is important to any organization that relies on humans for computer security. To
fill this gap, this study theoretically proposes and empirically tests the effects that a
comprehensive computer security policy has on human compliance with computer security
policy. Specifically, this study focuses on compliance issues associated with NMSVs, and does
not include issues associated with malicious, criminal intent.

It is the thesis of this study that a comprehensive computer security policy has a direct effect on
human compliance with computer security policy, which can be further explained through
indirect effects. The remainder of this paper includes sections comprising a literature review,
research model and hypotheses development, research methodology, expected results and
contribution, limitations, findings and conclusion, and other documentation necessary to support
this thesis.

Literature Review
Computer Security Culture & Policy
It is a premise of this study that human compliance with computer security policy is an element
of computer security culture that contributes to managing the human aspect of computer security.
Borrowing from Schein, van Niekerk & von Solms (2010) posit that organizational culture exists
at three levels (artifacts, espoused values, shared tacit assumptions) and that information security
knowledge, or lack thereof, represents a fourth level in the scope of an information security
culture. von Solms (2000) contends that an information security culture supports the policies,
procedures, methods and responsibilities of the organization in such a way that information
security becomes a natural aspect of the day-to-day activities of the workforce and endures long
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after those who originally created the cultural artifacts are gone. Straub (1994) posits that it is
important to learn as much as we can about the effects of culture on information technology
adoption and use within organizations. Da Veiga and Eloff (2010) contend that organizational
approach to computer security should focus on employee behavior, as the success or failure of an
organization is dependent upon actions that employees do, or fail to do. As such, organizations
need to develop a culture of computer security in order to address the threats that humans pose to
information assets.
Computer security practitioner Bruce Schneier (2004) contends that “security is a process, not a
product”, and to this end researchers van Niekerk & von Solms (2010) contend that many of the
processes necessary to protect information assets are largely dependent upon on human behavior.
van Niekerk & von Solms also contend that computer security culture can be viewed as an
additional layer of corporate culture, and is critical for managing the human factors associated
with information security. von Solms (2000) posits that computer security culture is necessary to
mitigate the risk that humans present to IS, given that the human dimensions of information
security cannot be solved by technical and procedural measures alone. Dhillon, Syed, & Pedron
(2016) posit that building and sustaining a strong computer security culture is important for the
protection of information assets, especially during times of change such as the merger of two
organizations. The authors contend that a strong culture of computer security forms the basis for
a common belief system to ensure that all stakeholders remain committed to the protection of
information assets during a time of change. The authors also contend that few studies focus on
security culture.

von Solms (2001) contends that the first artifact that must be created before any implementation
of information security can begin is a holistic and comprehensive computer security policy. A
comprehensive computer security policy taking into account all information security dimensions
serves as the central mandate and framework from which all governing sub-policies, procedures
and standards emerge. A top-level comprehensive security policy provides a secure foundation
for a comprehensive computer security program.

Organizations can spend millions on

information security technology to no avail if their workforce is not sufficiently aware of the
risk associated with information security.

Siponen (2000) contends information security
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awareness is of critical importance if the objective is to minimize user related faults and increase
the efficiency of security procedures from a user perspective. Siponen posits that development
of such a program requires a systematic approach and that behavioral theories should be
leveraged to provide answers to end users explaining why they should following security
guidelines.

Posthumus & von Solms (2004) state that executive management and the board of directors
should produce a high level organizational policy to visibly show commitment to information
security and its inclusion within organizational strategy. Creation of such a policy is typically an
antecedent activity to establishing the separate components of a computer security program, and
serves as a foundation to support separate components such as governance, training &
awareness, and sanctions. R. von Solms & von Solms (2004) posit that merely having a policy
in place does not ensure that the workforce will obey the policy; rather the policy must manifest
itself through organizational culture which is instantiated through an educational process such as
a training and awareness program. Failure to manage computer security from a comprehensive
enterprise perspective leads to a false sense of security, and little reduction in overall computer
security risk (B. von Solms, 2001; Zuccato, 2004, 2007).

Computer Security Policy Compliance
Spears & Barki (2010) contend that the human presence in computer security can be transformed
from that of a weak link to an asset that serves to mitigate the vulnerability of human error,
through increased participation in security policy compliance. The authors posit that human
awareness of computer security risk is fundamental to facilitating this transformation. Vroom &
von Solms (2004) suggest that alternative techniques beyond the traditional role of auditing need
to be developed to ensure human compliance with computer security policies, which are needed
to protect information assets.

Al-Omari, Deokar, El-Gayar, Walters, & Aleassa (2013) investigated the role of ethics to explain
human behavior with security policy compliance. The authors contend their findings provide a
theoretical explanation and empirical support for the impact of an employee’s ethical ideology in
security policy compliance. Puhakainen & Siponen
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security policy is a key concern for organizations, as failure to comply with security policy leads
to loss of security solution efficacy. Although security training and awareness is commonly
suggested as a solution for improving security policy compliance, the authors contend that few
studies rely on theory to explain the factors that influence human behavior in computer security
compliance. To validate their hypotheses, the authors leveraged the universal constructive
instructional theory and the elaboration likelihood model through an action research study. The
author’s findings confirm that computer security compliance training is an important factor in
improving human compliance, and that further research is needed in this domain.

Guo, Yuan, Archer & Connelly (2011) posit that non-malicious security violations (NMSVs)
share several characteristics; intentionality, self-benefiting without malicious intent, and
voluntary rule breaking.

Regardless of the characteristic, NMSVs harbor the potential to

introduce computer risk to an organization.

Intentional NMSVs represent intentional human

behavior not associated with accidental events. An example of an intentional NMSV is
intentionally clicking on an embedded link in a phishing email, when the email is known to be a
deliberate phishing attempt. Self-benefiting without malicious intent NMSVs represent human
behavior that results from humans trying to help themselves. An example of a self-benefiting
NMSV is when humans purposefully skip steps in a process or procedure to save time and effort.
Voluntary rule breaking NMSVs occur when humans consciously violate organizational policies
which define actions that they may or may not be allowed to do. Non-compliance with a
computer security policy is an example of a voluntary rule breaking NMSV.

The authors

contend that NMSV behavior differs from malicious behavior in that NMSV behavior is not
characterized as illegal, criminal activity.

Theory of Planned Behavior
The theory of planned behavior (TPB) is an extension of the theory of reasoned action (TRA)
(Madden, Ellen, & Ajzen, 1992). TPB seeks to predict and understand motivational influences
on human behavior. TPB differs from TRA in the addition of a perceived behavioral control
construct which has direct and indirect effects on behavior. Defined by Ajzen (1991), TPB
(Figure 1) states that human behavior is determined by factors that influence the intention to
perform a specific behavior. Rather than model specific human behavior, TPB models human
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behavioral intention. The stronger the intention to perform the behavior, the more likely it is that
the specific behavior will be performed. TPB was deemed a necessary extension to TRA due to
limitations in dealing with behavioral issues over which humans have incomplete volitional
control. For example, a person may believe their outcomes are determined by their behavior, but
they may also believe that their chances of achieving a desired outcome are not likely.

As a

result, perceived behavioral control varies across situations and actions, and in some cases can be
used directly to predict a successful behavioral attempt.

Figure 1. Theory of Planned Behavior
Ajzen’s TPB model consists of five constructs; attitude toward the behavior, subjective norm,
perceived behavior control, intention, and behavior (Table 1).

Attitude toward the behavior is

defined as the degree to which a person has a favorable or unfavorable evaluation or appraisal of
the behavior in question. Behavioral beliefs influence attitudes toward the behavior. Subjective
norm is defined as a social factor that refers to the perceived social pressure to perform or not
perform the behavior. Normative beliefs are the underlying determinants of subjective norms.
Perceived behavior control is defined as the perceived ease or difficulty of performing the
behavior, which also reflects past experience as well as anticipated impediments and obstacles.
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Control beliefs provide the basis for perceptions of behavioral control, which are strongly
influenced by the amount of control a person actually has over the resources required to perform
the behavior. As previously mentioned, a person may believe their outcomes are determined by
their behavior, but they may also believe that their chances of achieving a desired outcome are
not likely. Perceived behavioral control can be used to predict behavior, to the extent that
perceived control is realistic. Lastly, intention is defined as the dependent variable that captures
the aggregated motivational factors that influence behavior; the stronger the intention to perform
a behavior, the more likely it is for that behavior to be performed.

Thus, behavior has an

implied dependency on intent, given that behavior is directly proportional to intent (Song &
Zahedi, 2005).
Table 1. Conceptual Definition of TPB Constructs
Construct
Attitude toward the
behavior

Subjective norm

Perceived behavioral
control

Determinant

Definition

Independent

The degree to which a person has a favorable or
unfavorable evaluation or appraisal of the behavior
in question. Behavioral beliefs influence attitudes
toward the behavior.

Independent

A social factor that refers to the perceived social
pressure to perform or not perform the behavior.
Normative beliefs are the underlying determinants
of subjective norms.

Independent

The perceived ease or difficulty of performing the
behavior, which also reflects past experience as
well as anticipated impediments and obstacles.
Control beliefs provide the basis for perceptions of
behavioral control.

Intention

Dependent

Behavior

Implied Dependency

Intention captures the motivational factors that
influence behavior; the stronger the intention to
engage in a behavior, the more likely it is to be
performed.
The actual behavior to be performed. Dependency
is implied given that behavior is directly
proportional to intent (Song & Zahedi, 2005).

Tsohou, Karyda, & Kokolakis (2015) contend that compliance with security policies needs to be
aligned with the factors affecting the internalization of the security objectives. The authors posit
that studies on computer security compliance draw on theoretical backgrounds such as TPB,
TRA, protection motivation theory, and neutralization theory to understand human intention to
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comply with computer security policy. Dinev & Hu (2007) contend that TPB is one of the most
widely cited theoretical frameworks in IS literature on user technology acceptance.

Most IS

studies that reference TPB model four of the five TPB constructs, specifically attitude toward the
behavior, subjective norm, perceived behavior control, and intention. Given that that behavior is
directly proportional to intent, the behavior construct is not displayed in most IS studies.
Recent IS studies have used Ajzen’s TPB, modified with antecedent constructs (Appendix C), to
better understand the factors that influence human intention to perform a specific human
behavior. Human intention modeled in these studies includes the factors that influence human
intention to comply with computer security policy (Bulgurcu et al., 2010; Guo et al., 2011), the
factors that influence human intention to accept change in protective computer technologies
(Dinev & Hu, 2007), the factors that influence human intention to resist social engineering
(Flores & Ekstedt, 2016), and the factors that facilitate human intention to understand and adopt
e-commerce technology (Pavlou & Fygenson, 2006; Song & Zahedi, 2005).

In each of these

studies, researchers leveraged TPB to understand the factors that influence human intention to
perform some aspect of human behavior within information systems. While each of these
studies incorporates additional, antecedent constructs to further understand the core TPB
constructs, the core TPB model remains the same; constructs of attitude toward the behavior,
subjective norm, and perceived behavioral control are modeled as independent variables to
predict the construct of intention, which is modeled as the dependent variable.

Social Identity Theory
Hogg, Terry, & White (1995) contend that social identity theory (SIT) is an accepted perspective
on the social constructs of self-concept and normative behavior. The authors also contend that
SIT shares the same perspective as identity theory, with the primary distinction being that SIT is
a proven psychology theory used to explain group processes and intergroup relations. SIT is
used to explain behavioral tendencies that cause people to classify themselves and others into
various social categories such as religious affiliation, organizational recognition, gender, and
age. Ashforth & Mael (1989) posit that this classification gives a person the ability to segment
and order the social environment into a meaningful structure, and then to locate and define
themselves in that social environment. By socially identifying with a group, the individual is
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viewed as sharing in the group’s success and status. SIT was developed by Tajfel (Billig &
Tajfel, 1973), based on studies that explored the role of intergroup behavior. Cheung & Lee
(2010) contend that social identity helps to determine collective intention to perform a behavior.
The authors define three major components of social identity as cognitive social identity,
evaluative social identity, and affective social identity. The authors contend that if an end user
exhibits strong social identity toward a group behavior, then intention will increase.

Song & Kim (2006) synthesized TPB and social identity theory (SIT) to predict behavioral
intention to use a service. Specifically, Song & Kim leveraged the link between SIT and the
TPB construct of subjective norm. The authors contend that subjective norm is an important
determinant of behavioral intention to use a specific technology.

Interaction Theory
Change is typically met with resistance, and the introduction of change will encounter resistance
from those who are held accountable to the change. Markus (1983) contends that interaction
theory (INT) provides a framework against which the introduction of change can be better
managed. INT is posited to be useful with decentralized systems when a centralized system is
desired, and with systems that alter the balance of power in regard to those who lose power and
those who gain power.

Kling (1980) provides a starting point for explaining interaction theory (INT) by positing that
people and groups resist change introduced by system implementation due to the interaction
between characteristics in people and characteristics related to the system. The operative word
in interaction theory is interaction, as INT is based on the interactions between characteristics
related to people and characteristics related to systems, as opposed to individual, internal beliefs.
As an example, the interaction between people and information systems that often accompanies
organizational change might be perceived at odds with existing organizational culture. From this
perspective the greater the implied change, the more likely the resistance to the change. It is
from this perspective that Markus (1983) posits that INT represents a superior method for
developing information system implementation strategies for managing beliefs about resistance
during information system implementation. Markus extends Kling’s work by exploring variants
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in resistance to change during the implementation of computer based information systems.
Markus notes that similar variants on INT are made by Ginzberg (1975) and Keen (1981).
Markus posits that INT offers a superior theory for managing beliefs about resistance to change
that are encountered during information system implementation.

Some of the practical

recommendations for implementation posited by INT are; repair organizational problems before
introducing new systems, restructure incentives for system users and system designers,
restructure relationships between system users and system designers, and carefully determine the
initial users of the new system.

Deterrence Theory
IS studies have used deterrence theory (DET) to explain unethical human behavior involving the
use of technology in organizations. Deterrence theory suggests that the perceived certainty and
severity of formal sanctions serves as a deterrent to committing an illicit act (D'Arcy & Devaraj,
2012). D’Arcy & Devaraj contend that the threat of formal sanctions has both direct and indirect
influences on the intentional misuse of technology. Hu, Xu, Dinev, & Ling (2011) report
findings that partially contradict the accepted view of deterrent theory and information security,
by stating that behavior is influenced more by an individual’s personal ethics, or moral compass,
than the ramifications of a deterrent alone. This aligns with findings by Siponen & Vance (2010)
in which deterrence mechanisms are less effective when neutralization techniques are present.

Johnston, Warkentin, & Siponen (2015) posit that studies of sanction rhetoric have yielded
mixed results leading researches to question the effectiveness of fear appeals. The authors
contend that this is due to sanction rhetoric failing to focus on the impact of personal relevance,
while over emphasizing the impact to IS assets. The authors posit that sanction rhetoric that
emphasizes the impact of both personal relevance and IS relevance provides a positive influence
on intention to comply with information security policy, thus confirming that sanction rhetoric
influences human intention. D’Arcy & Greene (2014) contend that enforcement activities are a
key facet of any information security culture. D’Arcy & Devaraj (2012) contend organizations
face increased computer security risk due to organizations increasing reliance on IS to achieve
organizational objectives, with one risk being individual misuse of information assets. The
authors state that the threat of formal sanctions has direct and indirect influences on an
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individual’s intention to misuse information assets. Herath & Rao (2009) posit that sanctions are
effective in reducing negative behavior, and exhibit a positive influence on social behavior.

Literature Review Summary
The results of this literature review confirm that it is not well known how a comprehensive
computer security policy effects human compliance with computer security policy, as no studies
were found on this topic. The results also confirm that while the literature supports a holistic
enterprise computer security policy, the description of a comprehensive computer security policy
is not well defined. The notion of a comprehensive computer security policy encompassing both
IT computer security and OT computer security was not apparent. These findings represent gaps
in IS literature, and provide the motivation for this study.

Although terms such as information security and cybersecurity share similar meanings and tend
to be used interchangeably in the literature, R. von Solms & van Niekerk (2013) contend that the
terms are not fully analogous.

The authors posit that while information security and

cybersecurity reference similar language to define the processes and procedures used to protect
information assets, each term defines the impact of the human factor in a different way.
Information security typically refers to the human factor in regard to the role of the human in the
security process, while cybersecurity refers to the human factor as a potential target, or
vulnerability, of a cyberattack. For purpose of this study the term computer security adopts the
same meaning as information security, the impact of the human factor in a security process.

Research Model and Hypotheses Development
Theoretical Foundation
It is the thesis of this study that a comprehensive computer security policy has a direct effect on
human compliance with computer security policy, which can be further explained through
indirect effects. It is a premise of this study that human compliance with computer security
policy is an element of computer security culture that contributes to managing the human aspect
of computer security.

Based on these beliefs, and the acceptance within the IS research

community to leverage TPB to model intention to perform an IS behavior, TPB was selected as
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the theoretical foundation for measuring human intention to comply with a comprehensive
computer security policy.

TPB states that human behavior is determined by factors that influence human intention to
perform a specific behavior. Rather than model specific human behavior, TPB models human
behavioral intention. The stronger the intention to perform the behavior the more likely it is that
the specific behavior will be performed, given that behavior is directly proportional to intent. The
implication for this study is that the stronger the intention to comply with a comprehensive
computer security policy, the more likely it is that an end user will actually exhibit the behavior
to comply with the policy.

Figure 2. Theoretical Foundation

Given that perceived behavioral control varies across situations and actions, TPB provides a
framework to measure both the direct and indirect effects of human intention to comply with a
comprehensive computer security policy. Based on end user volitional control, the construct of
perceived behavior control provides the means to measure the direct effect of human intention to
comply with a comprehensive computer security policy.

To measure the indirect effects that impact intention to comply with a comprehensive computer
security policy, the TPB base model was extended by incorporating antecedent constructs
borrowed from social identity theory, interaction theory, and deterrence theory (Figure 2). SIT
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was chosen to further define the normative beliefs underlying the intention to comply. SIT helps
to explain group processes and intergroup relations, as well as behavioral tendencies that cause
people to classify themselves and others into various social categories such as religious
affiliation, organizational recognition, gender, and age.

Understanding why an end user

identifies positively or negatively with a group associated with the implementation of a
comprehensive computer security policy will provide meaningful insight into the normative
beliefs underlying the subjective norms that effect intention to comply.

INT was chosen to further define the interaction that occurs between an end user and their
significant referents to overcome resistance to change, in relation to shaping end user attitude
toward a comprehensive computer security policy.

Given that a comprehensive computer

security policy establishes the foundation for clear ownership of enterprise computer security by
merging the IT computer security domain with the OT computer security domain, it is practical
to expect that the introduction of a comprehensive computer security policy will encounter
resistance from those who are held accountable to the new policy.

Introduction of a

comprehensive computer security policy will inevitably cause a perceived shift in organizational
power between members of the IT domain and members of the OT domain, and this resistance
will need to be managed and mitigated if acceptance of the new policy is to be successful.

DET was chosen to further define the development of self-efficacy in regard to being confident
in one’s ability to comply with a comprehensive computer security policy. Although results are
mixed on whether or not deterrence positively impacts intention to comply with policy, sanction
rhetoric that emphasizes the impact of both personal relevance and IS relevance is believed to
provide a positive influence on intention to comply with policy. Personal relevance is impacted
by reinforcing the need for an end user to sharpen the skills necessary to perform a behavior,
which in turn reinforces end user confidence in performing the behavior in order to avoid the
enforcement of sanctions. Sanction enforcements are believed to be key to information security
culture, by reducing negative behavior and exerting a positive influence on social behavior.

Therefore, given the perceived influence of social identity, interaction with others, and the effect
of sanction rhetoric in positively effecting intention to comply with a comprehensive computer
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security policy, the theoretical concepts of SIT, INT, and DET are incorporated into the
theoretical foundation as antecedent theories to TPB (Figure 2). This theoretical foundation
contributes to a better understanding of human behavior and NMSVs.

This theoretical

foundation also aligns with Schein’s formal definition of organizational culture; “a pattern of
shared basic assumptions that was learned by a group as it solved its problems of external
adaptation and internal integration, that has worked well enough to be considered valid and,
therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation
to those problems.”

Hypotheses Development
This study draws on TPB to predict human intent to comply with a comprehensive computer
security policy. The use of TPB in recent IS literature to predict human intent is well
documented. Bulgurcu et al. (2010) leveraged a modified version of TPB to investigate the
factors that influence employees to comply with information security policy compliance for
purpose of protecting organizational information and technology assets (Table C1). Dinev &
Hu (2007) leveraged a modified version of TPB to understand user intention to accept the
introduction of new, protective technologies (Table C2). Flores & Ekstedt (2016) leveraged a
modified version of TPB to understand how organizational and individual factors complement
each other in shaping employee intention to resist social engineering (Table C3). Guo et al.
(2011) leveraged a modified version of TPB to understand user intentions to engage in NMSV
behavior (Table C4). Pavlou & Fygenson (2006) leveraged a modified version of TPB to
evaluate human beliefs for predicting e-commerce adoption (Table C5), while Song & Zahedi
(2005) leveraged TPB to develop a new conceptual framework for explaining website influence
on the behavior of online customers (Table C6). Therefore, based on the documented use of TPB
in recent IS research, hypotheses drawn against the TPB constructs of subjective norms, attitude,
and perceived behavioral control are included in the research model, but have been modified to
support this study. These hypotheses are included for completeness, as the research model
cannot be tested without these paths.

This study also incorporates constructs drawn from SIT, INT, and DET as antecedent constructs
to TPB constructs to better understand the indirect factors that predict human intent to comply
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with a comprehensive computer security policy.

In doing so, this study makes a unique

contribution to IS literature by incorporating TPB with other behavioral theories through the use
of antecedent constructs. Drawing from the use of SIT in recent IS studies, Cheung & Lee
(2010) leveraged SIT to measure group intention to use a social networking site by measuring
subjective norm and social identity. The authors contend that subjective norms reflect social
pressure from significant others to perform a behavior, as a user tends to rely on subjective
norms to decide whether or not to use a new technology. The authors posit that if an end user
exhibits strong social identity toward a group behavior, then intention will increase. Song &
Kim (2006) synthesized TRA, the progenitor of TPB, and SIT to predict behavioral intention to
use a service. Specifically, the authors leveraged SIT, TRA, and relationships between the
constructs of social identity and subjective norm to predict user intention. The authors contend
that subjective norms are an important determinant of behavioral intention to use a specific
technology.

Drawing from the use of INT in recent IS studies, Markus (1983) posits that INT represents a
superior method for managing beliefs about resistance to change, and that INT offers a superior
theory for managing the resistance encountered during information system implementation. INT
is posited to be useful with decentralized systems when a centralized system is desired, and with
systems that alter the balance of power in regard to those who lose power and those who gain
power.

Drawing from the use of DET in recent IS studies yields mixed results. While several studies
contend that enforcement activities are an important part of any information security culture, IS
studies incorporating DET have revealed positive and negative influences on intention.
D’Arcy & Devaraj (2012) contend that the threat of formal sanctions has direct and indirect
influences on an individual’s intention to misuse information assets. Herath & Rao (2009) posit
that sanctions are an effective mechanism in reducing negative behavior and exhibit a positive
influence on social behavior. Johnston, Warkentin, & Siponen (2015) contend sanction rhetoric
that emphasizes the impact of both personal relevance and IS relevance provides a positive
influence on intention to comply with information security policy, confirming that sanction
rhetoric influences human intention.
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Therefore, based on the usage pattern of the theory of planned behavior, social identity theory,
interaction theory, and deterrence theory in recent IS research, this study uses a modified
version of TPB to measure the factors that influence human intention to comply with a
comprehensive computer security policy. The traditional TPB constructs of subjective norms,
attitude, and perceived behavioral control (Table 1) are modeled in expected form as
independent variables against a construct of intention as the dependent variable. New constructs
of comprehensive computer security policy understanding, social identity with organizational
others, resistance to policy compliance, and perceived effect of sanctions for non-compliance
(Table 2) are incorporated as antecedent constructs to TPB (Figure 3) to further measure the
predictability of human intent to comply with a comprehensive computer security policy. In
regard to structural equation modeling (SEM) notation, the representation of each of these
constructs as exogenous or endogenous is indicated in Table 2.

Table 2. Research Model Constructs
Construct
Comprehensive
Computer
Security Policy

Label

CS

Understanding

Social Identity
with
Organizational
Others

Resistance to
Policy
Compliance

SI

RE

Perceived
Effect of
Sanctions for
NonCompliance

PS

Normative
Belief to

NB

Determinant
Antecedent to
TPB
Exogenous to this
study
Antecedent to
TPB
Endogenous to
this study
Antecedent to
TPB
Endogenous to
this study

Antecedent to
TPB
Endogenous to
this study

Independent

Definition

Source

End user understanding of a
top-level enterprise policy
incorporating all aspects of
enterprise computer security.

(CIM Reference Model
Committee International
Purdue Workshop on
Industrial Computer
Systems, 1989; ISACA,
2016)

Identity with one or more
groups that approve of
compliance with a
comprehensive computer
security policy.

(Cheung & Lee, 2010;
Song & Kim, 2006)

Introduction of a new policy
will encounter resistance
from those who are held
accountable to the new
policy.

(Markus, 1983)

Sanction rhetoric that
emphasizes the impact of
both personal relevance and
IS relevance provides a
positive influence on
intention to comply with the
new policy

(D'Arcy & Devaraj, 2012;
Hu et al., 2011; Johnston
et al., 2015; M. Siponen
& Vance, 2010)

The approval or disapproval
that end user peers are

(Ajzen, 1991), (Bulgurcu
et al., 2010), (Guo et al.,
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Comply with
Policy

Attitude
Toward
Comprehensive
Computer
Security

Self-Efficacy to
Comply with
Policy

Intention to
Comply With
Comprehensive
Computer
Security Policy

within TPB
Endogenous to
this study

AT

SE

IN

Independent
within TPB
Endogenous to
this study

Independent
within TPB
Endogenous to
this study

Dependent within
TPB
Endogenous to
this study

expected to express in
relation to complying with a
comprehensive computer
security policy.

2011), (Dinev & Hu,
2007), (Flores & Ekstedt,
2016; Pavlou &
Fygenson, 2006; Song &
Zahedi, 2005)

End user attitude toward
complying with a
comprehensive computer
security policy.

(Ajzen, 1991), (Bulgurcu
et al., 2010), (Guo et al.,
2011), (Dinev & Hu,
2007), (Flores & Ekstedt,
2016; Pavlou &
Fygenson, 2006; Song &
Zahedi, 2005)

End user perception of
personal skills, knowledge, or
competency regarding ability
to comply with a
comprehensive computer
security policy.

(Ajzen, 1991), (Bulgurcu
et al., 2010), (Guo et al.,
2011), (Dinev & Hu,
2007), (Flores & Ekstedt,
2016; Pavlou &
Fygenson, 2006; Song &
Zahedi, 2005)

End user intention to comply
with a computer security
policy.

(Ajzen, 1991), (Bulgurcu
et al., 2010), (Guo et al.,
2011), (Dinev & Hu,
2007), (Flores & Ekstedt,
2016; Pavlou &
Fygenson, 2006; Song &
Zahedi, 2005)

The hypotheses developed for this study were constructed as follows. It is postulated that
organizations create a comprehensive computer security policy incorporating enterprise scope
and ownership of IT computer security and OT computer security into a single, high level policy
that binds all humans in the enterprise to a common cause.

Once created, the enterprise must

educate the workforce to make each individual aware of the new policy, and help each individual
understand the purpose of the new policy and the benefits that will follow. The benefits will be
explained in terms of how they impact the enterprise and each individual; positive explanations
in the sense of the good things that will follow if individuals comply with the policy (reduced
human error and fewer NMSVs), and negative explanations in the sense of the bad things that
will follow if individuals do not comply with the policy (ongoing human error and more
NMSVs).

Drawing from the premise that SIT is used to explain behavioral tendencies that cause people to
classify themselves and others into various social categories, and that individuals with awareness
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and understanding of the personal and IS benefits of a comprehensive computer security policy
will identify with each other to avoid NMSV behavior by complying with a comprehensive
computer security policy under personal volitional control, it is hypothesized that:
Hypotheses 1 (H1) - An end user’s relationship beliefs about others in regard to avoiding NMSV
behavior is positively associated with the intention to comply with a comprehensive computer
security policy.

Once implemented, the existence of a comprehensive computer security policy may cause a
perceived shift in organizational power between members of the IT domain and members of the
OT domain. Changes to the status quo are typically met with resistance from the affected
individuals, and this resistance will need to be managed and mitigated if acceptance of the new
policy is to be successful. Drawing from the premise that INT in the form of constructive
conversation can be used to rationalize and overcome resistance toward complying with a
comprehensive computer security policy, it is hypothesized that:
Hypotheses 2 (H2) – An end user’s conversations with others in regard to complying with a
comprehensive computer security policy are positively associated with the intention to comply
with a comprehensive computer security policy.

Enforcement activities in the form of sanctions are an important part of persisting IS culture. IS
studies have shown that sanctions influence human intention. Sanction rhetoric that emphasizes
the impact of both personal relevance and IS relevance has been shown to have a positive
influence on intention to comply with IS policy. Drawing from the premise that DET in the form
of positive sanction rhetoric can be used to reinforce intention to comply with a comprehensive
computer security policy, it is hypothesized that:
Hypotheses 3 (H3) – Penalties that emphasize the enterprise benefit and end user benefit of
avoiding NMSV behavior are positively associated with the intention to comply with a
comprehensive computer security policy.
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Based on the premise that social identity with similar minded individuals serves as affirmation of
the normative beliefs associated with intention to comply; that conversation intended to
overcome resistance to change is an effective means of influencing the attitude of others thereby
influencing intention to comply; and that sanction rhetoric will influence self-efficacy and
personal intent to comply, it is hypothesized that these beliefs serve to bridge antecedent
constructs drawn from SIT, INT, and DET to their corresponding TPB constructs.

Drawing

from recent IS studies that have modified Ajzen’s TPB with antecedent constructs to better
understand the indirect factors that influence human intention to perform a specific human
behavior, it is hypothesized that:
Hypotheses 4 (H4) – An end user’s relationship beliefs about others in regard to avoiding NMSV
behavior enhances the normative belief to avoid NMSV behavior and is positively associated
with the intention to comply with a comprehensive computer security policy.
Hypotheses 5 (H5) – An end user’s conversations with others in regard to complying with a
comprehensive computer security policy enhances end user attitude toward complying with a
comprehensive computer security policy and are positively associated with the intention to
comply with a comprehensive computer security policy.
Hypotheses 6 (H6) – Penalties that emphasize the enterprise benefit and end user benefit of
avoiding NMSV behavior enhance end user self-efficacy toward complying with a comprehensive
computer security policy and are positively associated with the intention to comply with a
comprehensive computer security policy.

For this study, normative beliefs represent the underlying determinants of subjective norms. As
such, they represent the approval or disapproval that end user peers are expected to express in
relation to complying with a comprehensive computer security policy. Borrowing from the
literature, this study posits that an end user’s intention to comply with a comprehensive computer
security policy is positively associated with their personal belief and interactive group belief that
a comprehensive computer security policy will be positively received by their peers and
referents. Therefore, it is hypothesized that:
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Hypothesis7 (H7) – An end user’s normative beliefs toward a comprehensive computer security
policy are positively associated with their intention to comply with a comprehensive computer
security policy.

Table 3. Research Model Hypotheses
Hypothesis

Label

Description

1

H1

An end user’s relationship beliefs about others in regard to avoiding NMSV
behavior is positively associated with the intention to comply with a
comprehensive computer security policy.

2

H2

An end user’s conversations with others in regard to complying with a
comprehensive computer security policy are positively associated with the
intention to comply with a comprehensive computer security policy.

H3

Penalties that emphasize the enterprise benefit and end user benefit of
avoiding NMSV behavior are positively associated with the intention to
comply with a comprehensive computer security policy.

H4

An end user’s relationship beliefs about others in regard to avoiding NMSV
behavior enhances the normative belief to avoid NMSV behavior and is
positively associated with the intention to comply with a comprehensive
computer security policy.

H5

An end user’s conversations with others in regard to complying with a
comprehensive computer security policy enhances end user attitude
toward complying with a comprehensive computer security policy and are
positively associated with the intention to comply with a comprehensive
computer security policy.

6

H6

Penalties that emphasize the enterprise benefit and end user benefit of
avoiding NMSV behavior enhance end user self-efficacy toward complying
with a comprehensive computer security policy and are positively
associated with the intention to comply with a comprehensive computer
security policy.

7

H7

An end user’s normative beliefs toward a comprehensive computer
security policy are positively associated with their intention to comply with
a comprehensive computer security policy.

8

H8

An end user’s attitude toward a comprehensive computer security policy is
positively associated with their intention to comply with a comprehensive
computer security policy.

9

H9

An end user’s self-efficacy beliefs toward a comprehensive computer
security policy are positively associated with their intention to comply with
a comprehensive computer security policy.

H10

An end user’s understanding of the enterprise benefits and personal
benefits associated with a comprehensive computer security policy
positively affects their volitional control and intention to comply with a
comprehensive computer security policy.

3

4

5

10
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For this study, attitude refers to end user attitude toward a comprehensive computer security
policy. Borrowing from the literature, this study posits that an end user’s intention to comply
with a comprehensive computer security policy is positively associated with their attitude toward
a comprehensive computer security policy. This study also posits that normative belief in the
outcome of complying with a comprehensive computer security policy is positively associated
with their attitude toward a comprehensive computer security policy, and that their perception of
self-efficacy is positively associated with their attitude toward a comprehensive security policy.
Therefore, it is hypothesized that:
Hypothesis 8 (H8) – An end user’s attitude toward a comprehensive computer security policy is
positively associated with their intention to comply with a comprehensive computer security
policy.

For this study, self-efficacy represents the control beliefs that provide the basis for perceptions of
behavioral control, and is used interchangeably with perceived behavioral control. As such, selfefficacy represents end user judgment of personal skills, knowledge, or competency regarding
ability to comply with a comprehensive computer security policy. Borrowing from the literature,
this study posits that an end user’s intention to comply with a comprehensive computer security
policy is positively associated with their belief that they will be able to comply with a
comprehensive computer security policy. Therefore, it is hypothesized that:
Hypothesis 9 (H9) - An end user’s self-efficacy beliefs toward a comprehensive computer
security policy are positively associated with their intention to comply with a comprehensive
computer security policy.

Drawing from the premise that individuals with a positive awareness and understanding of a
comprehensive computer security policy will avoid NMSV behavior by complying with a
comprehensive computer security policy, and that self-efficacy in the form of volitional control
can be used directly to predict a successful behavioral attempt, it is hypothesized that:
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Hypothesis 10 (H10) – An end user’s understanding of the enterprise benefits and personal
benefits associated with a comprehensive computer security policy positively affects their
volitional control and intention to comply with a comprehensive computer security policy.

Control Variables
Control variables are variables that are not directly linked to hypotheses in a research model, but
are considered directly linked to the dependent variable (Flores & Ekstedt, 2016; Spector &
Branick, 2010). The dependent variable in this study is the construct labeled intention to comply
with comprehensive computer security policy (Table 2, IN). This study makes use of six control
variables (Appendix B, Table B2) to control for variance in the dependent variable. The control
variables for this study are age, gender, level of education, IT/OT identity, years of professional
computer experience working in an industry sector, and industry sector. The inclusion of
industry sector as a control variable aligns with the contention by Bulgurcu et al. (2010) that
some industries are more vulnerable to computer security issues than other industries.

For

purpose of this study, a modified three-sector theory construct (primary, secondary, tertiary,
quaternary) served as the basis for the industry sector model (Fisher, 1939).

Research Model
Following development of the theoretical foundation (Figure 2), the constructs listed in Table 2,
the hypotheses listed in Table 3, and the control variables listed in Appendix B (Table B2), each
variable was operationalized into the research model, or path diagram, shown in Figure 3.
Labeled the TPB Base Research Model with Antecedent Constructs, the research model depicted
in Figure 3 is a form of path diagram which describes the relationships between the various
model constructs. The model incorporates new antecedent constructs (dashed lines) from social
identity theory, interaction theory, and deterrence theory with traditional TPB constructs (solid
lines) to better understand the factors that influence intention to comply with a comprehensive
computer security policy.

Direct and Indirect Effects
A SEM model consists of two components; a structural model and a measurement model. The
structural model, often referred to as a path diagram, depicts the latent variables of a SEM
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model. The measurement model depicts the manifest, or observed, variables of a SEM model as
they relate to the structural model.

Together, the structural model combined with the

measurement model produce a complete SEM model (Byrne, 1998; Malhotra, Lopes, & Veiga,
2014).

The path diagram depicted in Figure 3 was drawn using a simplified form of SEM notation to
describe dependence relationships between independent and dependent variables. Relationships,
or paths, represent hypotheses and are indicated by the straight, single-headed arrows linking
independent variables with dependent variables.

Independent variables, also known as

exogenous variables, do not have any straight, single-headed arrows pointing at them.
Dependent variables, also known as endogenous variables, have one or more straight, singleheaded arrows pointing at them.

Thus indirect effects, or indirect paths, are represented by a

path linking three or more variables; one exogenous variable and two or more endogenous
variables. Direct effects, or direct paths, are represented by a path linking no more than two
variables; one exogenous variable and one endogenous variable. For purpose of this study,
Figure 3 contains three indirect effects; indirect path CS-SI-NB-IN, indirect path CS-RE-AT-IN,
and indirect path CS-PS-SE-IN. In contrast, Figure 3 contains only one direct effect; direct path
CS-IN. It is from this perspective that the research model depicted in Figure 3 will be used to
evaluate the thesis of this study that a comprehensive computer security policy has a direct effect
on human compliance with computer security policy, which can be further explained through
indirect effects.

The path diagram shown in Figure 3 models the inclusion of TPB constructs, new SIT, INT, and
DET antecedent constructs, 3 indirect (mediating) paths, 1 direct path, 6 control (moderating)
variables, 10 research hypotheses, 1 dependent variable (intention to comply), several
independent variables, 1 exogenous construct (comprehensive computer security policy), and
several endogenous constructs.

The final research model will include a measurement model in addition to the structural model,
or path diagram, shown in Figure 3. The structural model will consist of 8 latent variables, and
the measurement model will consist of 30 manifest variables.
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Figure 3. TPB Base Research Model with Antecedent Constructs (Path Diagram)

Using SEM, a type of statistical analysis that explains the strength of relationship between the
multiple variables that are linked together in a path diagram, the operationalized research model
will be used to determine whether or not the theoretical model (Figure 2) for this study fits the
actual relationships observed in the research model (Figure 3) for this study. Each of the
variables shown in Figure 3 is measurable using the survey instrument and indicators described
in Appendix B (Table B3).

Research Methodology
Protection of Human Subjects
In keeping with the policy for the protection of human subjects in research as described in 45
CFR 46.101 (b) (HHS, 2017), it is the intent of this study to minimize risk and optimize benefits
for each human participant, while completing the stated research objectives.

Survey Instrument and Data Collection
The research methodology for this study includes the collection of data using a survey
instrument, and analysis of the collected data using generally accepted multivariate data analysis
techniques (Hair, Black, Babin, & Anderson, 2010a; Kumar, 2005; Trochim & Donnelly, 2008).

doctoral dissertation final defense ACUNA v5.3

Page 32 of 97

The survey instrument (Appendix B) utilized a 7-point Likert scale for measurement.

TPB

recommends use of a 7-point Likert scale for measurement of belief strength and for evaluation
measurement (Ajzen, 1991). Measurement of TPB indicators in IS research is mixed, with
evidence of unipolar and bipolar, 7-point and 5-point Likert scales. This study adopts the
unipolar 7-point Likert scale recommended by Ajzen for measurement (Figure B1).

Use case

scenarios (Table B1) and questions (Table B3) for the survey instrument will be drawn, where
possible, from previous studies conducted in this research domain (Flores & Ekstedt, 2016; Guo
et al., 2011; Pavlou & Fygenson, 2006). Six control variables are utilized in this study (Table
B2); age, gender, level of education, IT/OT identity, years of professional computer experience
working in an industry sector, and industry sector.

Questionnaire distribution and subsequent data collection was contracted to Qualtrics (2016), a
commercial Internet service that specializes in survey based research. Costs associated with the
use of a commercial service were paid by the principal investigator at personal expense.
Although the survey instrument was modeled after recent IS studies that leveraged TPB survey
research, a small pilot survey (n=10) was conducted prior to the primary data survey to ensure
robustness. The target population for this study was experienced, industry based, authorized
users located in the United States, randomly selected from various industry sectors.

Qualtrics

provides participants with an incentive to participate based on the length of the survey, specific
participant profile, and participant acquisition difficulty. The specific type of reward varies and
may include cash, airline miles, gift cards, redeemable points, sweepstakes entry, and vouchers.
The incentive provided to participants was determined by Qualtrics and not the principal
investigator. The estimated cost per participant representing the cost of labor, services provided,
and incentive, was estimated at $12 to $15 per participant.

Identifiers capable of linking a

response to a participant, including Internet Protocol (IP) address, are managed by Qualtrics and
thus remain hidden and unknown to the principal investigator.

Sample Size
Hair et al. (2010a) recommend a sample size of 100 to 400 for SEM studies. The most common
SEM estimation procedure is maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) which supports a minimum
sample size of 50, but recommends a sample size of 200 to provide a sound basis for estimation.
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Under MLE, SEM sample sizes range between 100 – 400, as sample sizes greater than 400
become sensitive to meaningless differences resulting in goodness-of-fit (GOF) measures that
suggest a poor fit. Therefore, based on MLE recommendations for SEM studies, a sample size
of 200 (minimum) to 250 (maximum) questionnaires was targeted for this study. A maximum of
250 questionnaires compares favorably to MLE recommendations, and provides a small buffer of
padding should a less than reasonably high response rate be realized.

Institutional Review Board Application
Given the intent of this study to minimize risk and optimize benefits to human participants, the
use of a questionnaire survey instrument, the use of a commercial Internet service to separate the
principal investigator from any association with the study participants, and the intentional hiding
of identifiable participant information, exempt status was requested on the Institutional Review
Board (IRB) application for this study (Dakota State University Research Committee, 2015;
University of California Irvine Office of Research, 2006). Following review, the DSU IRB
granted exempt project approval #2016-2017-117 to this study on February 14, 2017 (Appendix
E).

Operationalization
The survey instrument (Appendix B) was operationalized (Appendix I) by the principal
investigator using the Qualtrics Insight software platform. Qualtrics then distributed the survey
and performed the data collection. A total of 210 questionnaires were collected for this study,
consisting of 106 IT identities and 104 OT identities. This compared favorably to the intended
target of collecting between 200 (minimum) to 250 (maximum) questionnaires for this study.

There were no missing or unknown responses, as the Qualtrics platform seeks to deliver fully
completed surveys. The collected data was exported from Qualtrics in CSV format and imported
into an Excel worksheet for data verification and descriptive analysis.

Following data

verification and descriptive analysis, the data was exported from Excel in CSV format, imported
into LISREL, and saved as a LISREL system file (.lsf) format for CFA and SEM analyses.
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Data Analysis - Descriptive Statistics
This study makes use of six control variables (Appendix B, Table B2) to control for variance in
the dependent variable. The control variables for this study are age, gender, level of education,
IT/OT identity, years of professional computer experience working in an industry sector, and
industry sector. Using Excel, a descriptive analysis was performed on the 210 questionnaires
collected for this study. The critical moderating influence in this study is the IT or OT identity
self-prescribed by each participant. As shown in Table 4, the collected data shows a balance of
this control variable with 50.48% (n=106) IT identities and 49.52% (n=104) OT identities.

Table 4. Participant Demographics
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Gender was not as evenly distributed, with 70.48% (n=148) of the participants identifying as
male, and 29.52% (n=62) identifying as female. Age was more evenly distributed with 48.57%
(n=102) of the participants being age 34 years or younger, and 51.43% (n=108) of the
participants being age 35 years or older. 43.81% (n=92) of the participants reported having
earned a bachelor’s degree, with 18.10% (n=38) reporting some level of graduate course work.
3.81% (n=8) of those indicating some level of graduate coursework reported having earned a
doctoral degree.

Table 5. Participant Beliefs (Aggregated Participant Responses)
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Work experience reflects a young workforce, with 60.95% (n=128) having 10 years or less of
practical work experience, and 39.05% (n=82) having more than 11 years of work experience.
Relevance to industry sector was evenly distributed between participants working with the
extraction or transformation of natural resources 46.67% (n=98), or being a provider of physical
or knowledge based services 53.3% (n=112).

A composite assessment of the data collected for this study can be found in Appendix F, Figures
F1 through F10. Each of the ten figures in Appendix F includes information relative to one of
the ten research hypotheses, or path hypotheses, depicted in the path diagram shown in Figure 3,
and listed in Table 3. As illustrated by the corresponding frequency distribution (Appendix F)
for each of the 30 manifest variables associated with the measurement model of this study,
participant responses dominate the right side (Somewhat Agree – Agree – Strongly Agree) of the
Likert scale.

This finding suggests empirical support for each of the research hypotheses

associated with the structural model (Table 3). This sentiment is summarized by the aggregated
responses shown in Table 5, which aggregates participant responses by the left side of the Likert
scale (Strongly Disagree – Disagree – Somewhat Disagree), the middle of the Likert Scale
(Neither Agree nor Disagree), and the right side of the Likert scale (Somewhat Agree – Agree –
Strongly Agree). On average, 85.63% of participant responses were recorded on the right side of
the Likert scale, suggesting a positive association between the research hypotheses and the
manifest variables associated with the measurement model. Conditional formatting within Table
5 is used to highlight aggregated responses less than 80% (yellow), suggesting a weaker path
hypothesis relationship, and aggregated responses greater than 90% (green), suggesting a
stronger path hypothesis relationship.

Of the identified relationships, the data suggests 2

research hypotheses (H3, H9), while positive, are in need of organizational attention.

In

particular, the data suggests that organizational management should provide visible recognition
to each authorized user that complies with computer security procedures (H32), while
recognizing that complying with a comprehensive computer security may require extra effort on
the part of each authorized user (H92, H93).

The data also suggest that 2 research hypotheses (H4, H10), also positive, are indicative of
personal best practices. In particular, the data suggests that strictly following computer security
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policies is a recognized best practice (H41), and that there is intent to comply with a
comprehensive computer security policy, regardless of how others think or act (HA1, HA3).

These findings suggest that there is empirical support for the thesis of this study, that a
comprehensive computer security policy has a direct effect on human compliance with computer
security policy, which can be further explained through indirect effects.
Data Analysis – Multivariate Statistics
Multivariate data analysis techniques performed on the collected data include confirmatory
factor analysis (CFA) and structural equation modeling (SEM). CFA and SEM are often used
together to measure the validity of a research model, to determine whether or not the theoretical
model fits the actual relationships observed in the research model. CFA is a statistical test used
to determine how well the latent variables described by the theoretical model match the reality of
data gathered by the manifest variables, or study observations. CFA differs from exploratory
factor analysis (EFA) in that CFA relies on theory to define latent variables and their
relationships before the study data is gathered, while EFA relies on statistical output to define
latent variables and their relationships after the study data is gathered. SEM is a family of
statistical models used to explain relationship strength between the latent variables that are
linked together in a path diagram. SEM performs this task by examining relationships between
the independent variables and the dependent variables in a path diagram as a series of equations
similar to a series of multiple regression equations (Hair et al., 2010a).

CFA and SEM analyses can be performed using one of several computer software packages.
This study used the LISREL (LInear Structural RELations) computer programming language to
perform the statistical analyses required for this study. A 12-month rental license for LISREL
v9.2 for Windows was purchased from Scientific Software International (SSI, 2017) on February
5, 2017. Licensing costs were paid by the principal investigator at personal expense.

While SEM models such as the TPB Base Research Model with Antecedent Constructs depicted
in Figure 3 are often drawn using a simplified form of notation to describe dependence
relationships between exogenous and endogenous variables, SEM models can also be drawn
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using a specific SEM lexicon known as LISREL notation (Appendix D). Although LISREL
refers specifically to a widely used computer program for SEM modeling, the LISREL platform
incorporates a unique lexicon, known as LISREL notation, to depict and describe SEM models in
minute detail. The use of LISREL notation to describe non-LISREL models and their results is a
commonly accepted SEM practice (Hair et al., 2010a). Unfortunately, the LISREL software
does not automatically generate LISREL notation in its output images. Instead, each LISREL
symbol depicted on a LISREL SEM image must be manually inserted. While it was initially
anticipated that the LISREL images displayed in this study would include LISREL notation, this
step was not taken due to the amount of time and effort required to complete this task.

For purpose of SEM modeling, Likert scale responses which represent ordinal data are treated
within LISREL as continuous data. Joreskog (2005) contends that each ordinal variable z has an
underlying continuous variable z* representing the ordinal response. It is the underlying
continuous variable z* that is used within the LISREL SEM model, not the observed variable z,
with z* assumed to have a range from -∞ to +∞. While some researchers within the academic
community acknowledge the practice of modeling ordinal data as continuous data within a SEM
model (Hair et al., 2010a; Malhotra et al., 2014), others do not. For purpose of this study, Likert
scale ordinal data is treated as continuous data within the LISREL SEM model.

Confirmatory Factor Analysis
Appendix G includes an image of the standardized SEM model generated by LISREL for this
study. Due to technical difficulty in copying complex screen images from LISREL into Word,
the image included in this Word document is grainy and difficult to read. However, the image
provides a reasonable view of the CFA model produced by this study. The CFA model suggests
a less than optimal fit of the structural model to the measurement model. While the normed χ2
(χ2 / df) of 4.27 is acceptable, a p-value of 0.000 and an RMSEA of 0.125 are unacceptable.
Acceptable CFA fit statistics should include a p-value approaching 1.0 and an RMSEA <= 0.08.
Given this early prognosis, we turn our attention to the SEM model for this study.
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Model Identification
SEM identity is associated with degrees of freedom (df). A model is underidentified if df < 0,
just-identified if df = 0 and overidentified if df > 0 (Diamantopoulos & Siguaw, 2000; Hair et al.,
2010a). Identity is an indicator of whether or not the measurement model provides sufficient
information to obtain a unique solution, as determined by the difference between known
information and unknown information. Models that are underidentified are useless, and result in
a system of equations that cannot be solved.

Models that are just-identified yield a perfect fit, sometimes referred to as a saturated fit, because
their fit is determined by circumstance. Just-identified models are designated as identified
(Schumacker & Lomax, 1996) and deemed acceptable (Hair et al., 2010a). However, justidentified SEM models are viewed as trivial and do not support scientific usefulness for testing
theories (Diamantopoulos & Siguaw, 2000; Hair et al., 2010a).

SEM researchers prefer models that are overidentified, models that have more knowns than
unknowns. However, even though a model may be proven to be overidentified it may not exhibit
goodness-of-fit, suggesting that models exhibiting goodness-of-fit represent the phenomena in
question (Diamantopoulos & Siguaw, 2000; Hair et al., 2010a; Rigdon, 1997). Diamantopoulos
& Siguaw contend that changes intended to induce better fit must be theoretically justified, and
that constraints should never be added randomly to obtain identification. The authors note that
“it is better to be known for having developed the correct model (even if you could not get
estimates of its coefficients) than for having identified and estimated the wrong model (Hayduk,
1987).” As such, the SEM model for this study is overidentified, given df = 397 (Appendix H).

Construct Reliability
Construct reliability (Table 6) was tested using Cronbach’s alpha, composite factor reliability
(CFR), and average variance expected (AVE). The results show support for construct reliability
given that all Cronbach alpha scores are greater than the threshold value of 0.70, all CFR scores
are greater than the threshold value of 0.70, and all AVE scores are greater than the threshold
value of 0.50, thereby indicating acceptable construct reliability (Hair et al., 2010a; Zaiontz,
2017). It is interesting to note that while LISREL outputs the raw data necessary to calculate
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Cronbach’s alpha, CFR, and AVE, LISREL does not output the finished score for any of these
statistics. Instead, each of the statistics listed in Table 6 was calculated manually using Excel
(Diamantopoulos & Siguaw, 2000; Zaiontz, 2017).

Table 6. Construct Reliability

Factor Loadings
Table 7 lists the standardized factor loadings for each manifest variable onto its assigned latent
variable. As indicated by conditional formatting, all loadings are greater than 0.70 with the
exception of manifest variables H31 and H93. This finding indicates support for the structural
model, with the exception of the latent variables and manifest variables located on indirect path
CS-PS-SE-IN.

Structural Equation Modeling
Appendix H includes an image of the unstandardized SEM model generated by LISREL for this
study. Due to technical difficulty in copying complex screen images from LISREL into Word,
the image included in this Word document is grainy and difficult to read. However, the image
does provide a reasonable view of the SEM model produced by this study. The LISREL model
for this study includes the following components; a structural model consisting of 8 latent
variables, a measurement model consisting of 30 manifest variables, 3 indirect paths, 1 direct
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path, 1 exogenous variable, 7 endogenous variables, and 1 dependent variable. Each of these
components is visible in the LISREL model shown in Appendix H.

Table 7. Standardized Factor Loadings

Direct and Indirect Effects
The thesis of this study is that a comprehensive computer security policy has a direct effect on
human compliance with computer security policy, which can be further explained through
indirect effects. As illustrated by Figure 4 and Appendix H, and listed in Table 8, this SEM
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model suggests partial mediation of new antecedent constructs SI, RE, PS, and TPB against the
direct effect of a comprehensive computer security upon intent, indicating that the mediating
constructs do not fully explain the construct relationships between the latent variables in the
structural model.

Figure 4. Path Diagram showing Unstandardized Direct and Indirect Effects

Table 8. Unstandardized Direct and Indirect Effects

The unstandardized path coefficients listed in Figure 4, Appendix H, and Table 8 reflect the
magnitude of change in a dependent variable from a unit change in an independent variable
(Diamantopoulos & Siguaw, 2000). The sign of the coefficient indicates the direction of the
change; positive signs indicate an increase in the dependent variable, while negative signs
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indicate a decrease in the dependent variable. Thus, a unit change within indirect paths CS-SINB-IN and CS-RE-AT-IN serves to increase intent to comply with a comprehensive computer
security policy, while a unit change within indirect path CS-PS-SE-IN serves to decrease intent
to comply with a comprehensive computer security policy. A total indirect effect of 0.245
compared to a direct effect of 0.452 indicates partial mediation, suggesting that the direct effect
of a comprehensive computer security policy against human intent to comply is stronger than the
indirect effect of the mediating constructs, thereby supporting the thesis of this study.

Table 9. Research Model Hypotheses Support
Hypothesis

1

2

3

4

5

6

Label

H1

H2

H3

H4

H5

H6

Coefficient

0.697

0.620

0.512

0.261

0.993

1.363

p-value

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

Support

Description

Yes

An end user’s relationship beliefs about others in regard to
avoiding NMSV behavior is positively associated with the
intention to comply with a comprehensive computer
security policy.

Yes

An end user’s conversations with others in regard to
complying with a comprehensive computer security policy
are positively associated with the intention to comply with
a comprehensive computer security policy.

Yes

Penalties that emphasize the enterprise benefit and end
user benefit of avoiding NMSV behavior are positively
associated with the intention to comply with a
comprehensive computer security policy.

Yes

An end user’s relationship beliefs about others in regard to
avoiding NMSV behavior enhances the normative belief to
avoid NMSV behavior and is positively associated with the
intention to comply with a comprehensive computer
security policy.

Yes

An end user’s conversations with others in regard to
complying with a comprehensive computer security policy
enhances end user attitude toward complying with a
comprehensive computer security policy and are positively
associated with the intention to comply with a
comprehensive computer security policy.

Yes

Penalties that emphasize the enterprise benefit and end
user benefit of avoiding NMSV behavior enhance end user
self-efficacy toward complying with a comprehensive
computer security policy and are positively associated with
the intention to comply with a comprehensive computer
security policy.

7

H7

0.521

0.035

Yes

An end user’s normative beliefs toward a comprehensive
computer security policy are positively associated with
their intention to comply with a comprehensive computer
security policy.

8

H8

0.357

0.000

Yes

An end user’s attitude toward a comprehensive computer
security policy is positively associated with their intention
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to comply with a comprehensive computer security policy.

9

10

H9

H10

(0.099)

0.452

0.112

0.000

No

An end user’s self-efficacy beliefs toward a comprehensive
computer security policy are positively associated with
their intention to comply with a comprehensive computer
security policy.

Yes

An end user’s understanding of the enterprise benefits and
personal benefits associated with a comprehensive
computer security policy positively affects their volitional
control and intention to comply with a comprehensive
computer security policy.

The study results listed in Table 9 indicate statistical support for 9 of the 10 research hypotheses,
or path hypotheses, pursued by this study. With the exception of hypothesis 9, (H9), each of the
research hypotheses listed in Table 9 indicates a positive association with intention to comply
with a comprehensive computer security policy, and is statistically significant with a p-value <
0.05.

Study results indicate that hypothesis 9, (H9), is not supported due to a negative

association with intention to comply with a comprehensive computer security policy and a pvalue > 0.05. This finding suggests that despite an awareness of the benefit associated with
comprehensive computer security compliance, the act of being in compliance may require more
effort than is perceived as practical.

Goodness-of-Fit Measurement
SEM model goodness-of-fit (GOF) measurement compares theory to reality by comparing the
difference between the estimated covariance matrix (structural model), or theory, to the observed
covariance matrix (measurement model), or reality (Hair et al., 2010a). If the modeled theory is
perfect, then a comparison of the estimated covariance matrix and the observed covariance
matrix will show no difference, or a perfect fit, between the two matrices. Any observed
variance between the estimated covariance matrix and the observed covariance matrix indicates
a less than perfect fit, with the difference between the two matrices being an indicator of the
goodness-of-fit.

For SEM models, the implied null hypothesis is that there is no difference between the estimated
covariance matrix, or theory, to the observed covariance matrix, or reality, meaning that the
research model is a good fit with reality. The test statistic used to measure variance between the
two matrices is the chi-square statistic (χ2). Given that the value of χ2 increases as the variance
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between the two matrices increases, we also reference the p-value associated with the χ2 test to
assess the equality of estimated covariance matrix and the observed covariance matrix, within a
given population (Hair et al., 2010a). This leads to desired critical values of a relatively small χ2
value that approaches zero (0), and a correspondingly large p-value >= 0.05 that approaches one
(1). Therefore, the objective of a SEM model χ2 GOF test is to accept the null hypothesis by
observing a small χ2 value that approaches zero, and a correspondingly large p-value >= 0.05 that
approaches one, thereby indicating that the research model is a good fit with reality (Table 10).

Table 10. SEM Model Test Hypotheses and Test Statistics
Test Hypotheses

Test
Statistics

Critical Values

H0: Theoretical model fits the observed model;

χ

Small χ approaching zero

there are no significant differences between the
estimated and observed covariance matrices.
Theory matches reality.

p-value

p-value >= 0.05 approaching one

Ha: Theoretical model does not fit the observed

χ

Large χ approaching one

model; there are significant differences between
the estimated and observed covariance matrices.
Theory does not match reality.

p-value

p-value < 0.05 approaching zero

2

2

2

2

Given the test statistics for this SEM model of χ2 = 1858.19, df = 397, and p-value of 0.00
(Appendix H), the null hypothesis is rejected in favor of the alternate hypothesis; there are
significant differences between the estimated and observed covariance matrices. Theory does
not match reality for this particular model.
However, Hair et al. (2010a) contend that “the researcher should report at least one incremental
index and one absolute index in addition to χ2 and df.” This is due to known problems fitting χ2
to SEM models with a large number of indicators, and the practice of looking at fit indices across
a wide range of situations. Accordingly, Table 11 lists additional absolute and incremental
indices for the SEM model produced by this research. Despite rejection of null hypothesis for
this study due to the χ2 test previously discussed, the absolute index of normed χ2 (χ2 / df)
indicates that the SEM model produced by this research is significant with a value of 4.681. In
addition, standardized root mean residual (SRMR) indicates significance with a value of 0.057.
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Other absolute indices of root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) and goodness-of-fit
(GFI) fail, with values of 0.132 and 0.644 respectively.

Table 11. SEM Model Goodness-of-Fit Indices

Both of the incremental indices reported for this study fail to indicate significance. Neither the
comparative fit index (CFI) or the normed fit index (NFI) indicate significance with values of
0.808 and 0.769 respectively. Thus, given the originally stated test statistics of χ2 and p-value,
combined with failure of 4 of 6 additional goodness-of-fit tests, the initial rejection of the null
hypothesis in favor of the alternate hypothesis stands; there are significant differences between
the estimated and observed covariance matrices.

Theory does not match reality for this

particular model.

Limitations
SEM and LISREL
The selection of SEM as a research methodology and LISREL as a SEM modeling tool
represents a significant undertaking for a first-time research project. SEM requires a solid
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understanding of relevant domain theory, factor analysis, multiple regression, matrix algebra,
and measurement scales. LISREL is a complex software program that provides a limited support
model. Aligning a LISREL model with SEM conventions requires a significant amount of
LISREL knowledge and expertise, as much of learning how to use LISREL and interpreting its
output is left to the researcher to decipher. As a result, practical LISREL knowledge for this
study was gathered from email conversations with Dr. Gerhard Mels at SSI, the LISREL
application help system, books purchased over the Internet, published research, discussions with
SEM practitioners, and explanatory videos found on YouTube.

The rapid pace of learning

resulted in a few misunderstandings, and the need to retrace some initial steps to correct
misinterpreted results.

Sacrificing Theory for Reality
Based on LISREL output, statistical goodness-of-fit for the SEM model was not achieved. As a
result, the null hypothesis was rejected in favor of the alternate hypothesis indicating that there
are significant differences between the estimated and observed covariance matrices. Unadvised
but fueled by curiosity, several attempts were made to restructure the manifest variables in an
effort to produce a measurement model that aligned with the structural model. While some of
these efforts yielded promising results, most resulted in abnormalities such as Heywood cases.
Mindful of academic integrity, and the understanding that changes intended to induce a better fit
must be theoretically justified, efforts to restructure the measurement model to better fit the
structural model were discontinued and discarded.

While it is tempting to pursue solutions within the measurement model to better fit the structural
model, this is the wrong path to follow. By design, SEM models are based on theoretical
substance and poor fitting SEM models should be reevaluated from a theoretical perspective, not
a data perspective. In practice, it is difficult to produce a good fitting model (Diamantopoulos &
Siguaw, 2000; Hair et al., 2010a). Diamantopoulos & Siguaw note that “it is better to be known
for having developed the correct model (even if you could not get estimates of its coefficients)
than for having identified and estimated the wrong model (Hayduk, 1987).”
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Generalizability
The target population for this study was experienced, industry based, authorized users located in
the United States. Future studies would benefit from broadening the target population to include
authorized users from a global population.

Findings and Contribution
Findings
Empirical findings indicate an average of 85.63% of participant responses (Table 5) were
recorded on the right side of the Likert scale, suggesting a positive association between the
research hypotheses and the manifest variables associated with the measurement model. In
particular, the data suggests that organizational management should provide visible recognition
to each authorized user that complies with computer security procedures, while recognizing that
complying with comprehensive computer security procedures may require extra effort on the part
of each authorized user. Two additional research hypotheses, also positive, suggest personal
best practices. In particular, the data suggests that strictly following computer security policies is
a recognized best practice, and that there is intent to comply with a comprehensive computer
security policy, regardless of how others think or act.

The LISREL output for this study states that the SEM model is overidentified, an indicator that
the measurement model provides sufficient information to obtain a unique solution. LISREL
output also shows support for construct reliability (Table 6) based on acceptable scores for
Cronbach’s alpha, CFR and AVE. This finding is reflected in the statistical support for 9 of the
10 research hypotheses, or path hypotheses, pursued by this study. With the exception of the
focus on sanctions and self-efficacy (H9), each of the research hypotheses (Table 9) indicates a
positive association with intention to comply with a comprehensive computer security policy,
and is statistically significant with a p-value < 0.05. Study results indicate that the focus on
sanctions and self-efficacy, (H9), is not supported due to a negative association with intention to
comply with a comprehensive computer security policy and a p-value > 0.05. This finding
suggests that despite an awareness of the benefit associated with comprehensive computer
security compliance, the act of compliance requiring more effort than is perceived as practical.
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Study findings indicate partial mediation of indirect effects compared to the direct effect of a
comprehensive computer security policy on human intent to comply with computer security
policy. This finding suggests that the direct effect of a comprehensive computer security policy
against human intent to comply is stronger than the indirect effect of the mediating constructs,
thereby supporting the thesis of this study.

However, the measurement model does not fully align with the structural model given the
goodness-of-fit indices (Table 11) produced by LISREL. Thus, given the originally stated test
statistics of χ2 and p-value, combined with the failure of several additional goodness-of-fit tests,
the initial rejection of the null hypothesis in favor of the alternate hypothesis stands firm; there
are significant differences between the estimated and observed covariance matrices. Theory
does not match reality for this particular model.

Contribution
Despite the statistically insignificant results for this particular SEM model, this study delivers
several contributions that serve to encourage future work that will benefit researchers and
practitioners in alike.

First, this research represents a unique contribution to IS literature in that no peer reviewed
research was found that explained the direct effect of a comprehensive computer security policy
on human computer security compliance through an understanding of its indirect effects. The
SEM model for this study is based on the convergence of IT computer security with OT
computer security, and future discovery of statistically significant results in this problem space
will provide researchers with a descriptive understanding of the direct and indirect effects on
human intention to comply with a comprehensive computer security policy.

Second, this research is timely in that modern computer threats and computer vulnerabilities are
evolving rapidly and are capable of introducing significant computer risk to both the IT computer
domain and the OT computer domain. Recognition of this phenomenon is underscored by the
notion that theory is not the exclusive domain of academia, but can also be found in the
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experience and practice gathered through the observation of real world behavior (Hair et al.,
2010a; Lee, 1999).

Third, discovery of statistically significant results in this problem space will help drive the
prescriptive application of a shared, comprehensive computer security policy which will have a
positive impact on computer security awareness.

Improved computer security awareness,

leading to a better understanding of the practical benefits of compliance with a shared,
comprehensive computer security policy, will help manage the resistance to change that is often
encountered when change alters the perception of power in regard to those who lose power and
those who gain power. An increase in computer security awareness and understanding will
contribute to an increase in personal intent to comply with such a policy, resulting in the direct
effect of reduced human error and fewer occurrences of NMSVs.

Lastly, discovery of statistically significant results in this problem space and the practical
application of those findings will benefit the enterprise by helping to develop a comprehensive
culture of computer security by incorporating enterprise scope and ownership of computer
security into a single, overarching policy that binds all humans in the enterprise to a common
cause. Future discovery of statistically significant findings will reinforce Schein’s (2004)
contention that culture is an abstraction, and that organizations need to understand the forces that
result from social and organizational situations lest they fall victim to them. In addition, the
findings will contribute to the ongoing development and persistence of organizational culture as
defined by Schein; “a pattern of shared basic assumptions that was learned by a group as it
solved its problems of external adaptation and internal integration, that has worked well enough
to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to
perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems.”

Conclusion
Although this study did not produce a statistically significant SEM model, it did yield empirical
findings that suggest there is practical support for the thesis of this study, that a comprehensive
computer security policy has a direct effect on human compliance with computer security policy,
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which can be further explained through indirect effects. As a result, it is the intent of the
principal investigator to continue this research in the form of future work.

Future Work
This study represents a promising first effort at using SEM to understand the phenomena of
direct and indirect effects of a comprehensive computer security policy on human compliance
with computer security policy. Table 12 lists recommended future work activities to further
develop this research.

Table 12. Recommended Future Work Activities
Activity

Future Work Description

1

Analyze the collected data for moderating effects of the control variables.

2

Perform EFA on the collected data to discover unknown relationships
between latent variables and manifest variables.

3

Revisit the structural model for soundness of theory.

4

Revisit the measurement model for soundness of scale.

5

Design an overidentified SEM model.

6

Perform a new data collection using the redesigned measurement model.

7

Perform new CFA and SEM analyses using the newly collected data.

8

Evaluate the new CFA and SEM results using incremental indices and
absolute indices.
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 December 2015: Dissertation Chair Approval Form filed with the Dakota State University
(DSU) Office of Graduate Studies and Research; Dr. Shuyuan Lance Deng.
 January 2016: Dissertation Committee Approval Form filed with the DSU Office of Graduate
Studies and Research.
 March 2016: Double-blind, peer-reviewed acceptance of this study as a research-in-progress
manuscript by the program committee for the 11th Annual MWAIS Conference and Proceedings.
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Milwaukee, WI.
 August 2016: Dissertation Chair Approval Form and Dissertation Committee Approval Form refiled due to faculty changes at DSU; Dr. Daniel A. Talley.
 November 2016: Doctoral Dissertation Proposal Defense of this research presented to the
dissertation committee in a public forum at DSU, via the Internet.
submitted to the dissertation committee for review and approval.

Qualifying Portfolio

Received notice of AIS

Doctoral Student Service Award recipient.
 January 2017: Qualifying Portfolio approved.
 February 2017: Exempt project approval issued by the DSU Institutional Review Board (IRB).
Data collection phase begins, followed by data analysis.
 March 2017: Double-blind, peer-reviewed acceptance of this study as a research-in-progress
manuscript by the program committee for the 12th Annual MWAIS Conference and Proceedings.
 May 2017: Presentation of this study as research-in-progress, in person, at MWAIS 2017,
Springfield, IL.
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 June 2017: Final Doctoral Dissertation Defense of this research presented to the dissertation
committee in a public forum situated at DSU, via teleconference.

August 2017: Consider submission of findings for publication in an academic journal, selecting
from the Journal of Association of Information Systems (JAIS), the Journal of Computer
Information Systems (JCIS), Information Systems Frontiers (ISF), or the Journal of the Midwest
Association for Information Systems (JMWAIS). The following criteria were considered in the
selection of journals for publication of this study. JAIS is a member of the Association for
Information Systems (AIS) Senior Scholars’ Basket of Journals (Association for Information
Systems, 2015).

In addition, JAIS (#9), JCIS (#13), and ISF (#18) are ranked high in the

perceived value of 50 information systems research journals (Peffers & Tang, 2003). JMWAIS
is not ranked by Peffers & Tang given its inaugural publication date of January 2015.
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Appendix B - Survey Instrument

Figure B1. 7-Point Likert Scales

Table B1. Survey Scenarios
Scenario

Tag

Theory

Description (effect)

Identity and awareness of
a comprehensive
computer security policy

SC1

SIT, INT,
DET

(Indirect) I understand a comprehensive computer
security policy. For various reasons it is important that
my co-workers and I comply with this policy.

Mapping of antecedent
constructs to TPB
constructs

SC2

SIT, INT,
DET, TPB

(Indirect) My thoughts and actions, peer relationships,
and known deterrents affect my intention to comply
with a comprehensive computer security policy.

My intent to comply with
a comprehensive
computer security policy

SC3

TPB

(Indirect) Based on my beliefs, attitude, and selfefficacy, I intend to comply with a comprehensive
computer security policy.

TPB

(Direct) Through my personal awareness of and
personal understanding of a comprehensive computer
security policy, I have the ability to comply with a
comprehensive computer security policy.

Volitional control and
direct intent to comply
with a comprehensive
computer security policy

SC4

Table B2. Control Variables
Demographic

Tag

Description

Age

AGE

Age

Gender

GEN

Gender assigned at birth; male / female

Level of Education

EDU

Highest level of education attained

IT/OT Identity

XTD

Current job identifies most closely with IT or OT

Computer Experience

CEX

Total years’ experience working as a computer
practitioner in an industry sector

Industry

IDS

Industry sector
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Table B3. Survey Questions
Hypothesis Scenario

H1

H2

H3

Tag

H6

Scale

Source

SC1

H11

My coworkers agree that I should
comply with this new policy.

Likert
Belief

(Guo et al., 2011)

SC1

H12

My coworkers will think that I should
comply with the new computer security
policy.

Likert
Belief

(Guo et al., 2011)

SC1

H13

My supervisor will want me to comply
with this new policy.

Likert
Belief

(Guo et al., 2011)

SC1

H21

It is important that I convince my
coworkers to comply with the new
computer security policy.

Likert
Belief

Principal Investigator

SC1

H22

My coworkers rely on my opinion.

Likert
Belief

Principal Investigator

SC1

H23

This new policy is important and others
need to know how I feel about it.

Likert
Belief

Principal Investigator

SC1

H31

I will be reprimanded if my organization
is aware of my non-secure actions.

Likert
Belief

(Guo et al., 2011)

SC1

H32

My management notices when I follow
security procedures, and encourages
me to keep doing a good job!

Likert
Belief

(Guo et al., 2011)
Sanctions

SC1

H33

I am encouraged when the company
notices I am following security
procedures.

Likert
Belief

(Guo et al., 2011)
Sanctions

SC2

H41

As an IT professional, I have to do
certain things on my job. Strictly
following computer security policies is
one of them.

Likert
Belief

(Guo et al., 2011)
Identity match

SC2

H42

Following computer security rules and
policies is an important part of my work
as an IT professional.

Likert
Belief

(Guo et al., 2011)
Identity match

SC2

H43

Breaking security policies hurts my
image as a business professional.

Likert
Belief

(Guo et al., 2011)
Identity match

SC2

H51

This security policy helps to secure
information systems.

Likert
Belief

(Guo et al., 2011)

SC2

H52

This security policy is absolutely
necessary.

Likert
Belief

(Guo et al., 2011)
Attitude

SC2

H53

This security policy is important.

Likert
Belief

(Guo et al., 2011)
Attitude

SC2

H61

I understand the risks posed by poor
security and that I may be reprimanded
if I don’t comply with policy.

Likert
Belief

H4

H5

Question

doctoral dissertation final defense ACUNA v5.3

Workgroup norm

Workgroup norm

Workgroup norm

Sanctions

Attitude

(Flores & Ekstedt,
2016)
Awareness

Page 63 of 97

SC2

SC2

H7

H8

H9

H10

H62

H63

I am aware of the potential threats and
negative consequences that are
possible if I don’t follow the proper
security procedures.

Likert
Belief

It is important that I follow the rules for
keeping my organization secure so that I
don’t get into trouble.

Likert
Belief

(Flores & Ekstedt,
2016)
Awareness
(Flores & Ekstedt,
2016)
Awareness

SC3

H71

My co-workers and I agree that
complying with the new policy is the
right thing to do.

Likert
Belief

(Guo et al., 2011)

SC3

H72

It is important to me that my coworkers comply with the new policy.

Likert
Belief

(Guo et al., 2011)

SC3

H73

It is important that my co-workers know
that I intend to comply with the new
computer security policy.

Likert
Belief

(Guo et al., 2011)

SC3

H81

I believe that complying with the new
security policy is a good idea.

Likert
Belief

(Guo et al., 2011)

SC3

H82

I think that complying with the new
security policy is the right thing to do.

Likert
Belief

(Guo et al., 2011)
Attitude

SC3

H83

By complying with the new security
policy I am helping the company stay
secure from computer threats.

Likert
Belief

(Guo et al., 2011)
Attitude

SC3

H91

Complying with the new policy helps to
improve my job performance.

Likert
Belief

(Guo et al., 2011)
Performance

SC3

H92

Complying with the new policy lets me
perform my tasks more effectively.

Likert
Belief

(Guo et al., 2011)
Performance

SC3

H93

Complying with the new policy makes it
easier for me to do my job.

Likert
Belief

(Guo et al., 2011)
Performance

SC4

H101

I am confident that I will comply with
the new computer security policy.

Likert
Belief

Principal Investigator

SC4

H102

I understand the benefits of the new
computer security policy and I intend to
comply with it.

Likert
Belief

Principal Investigator

SC4

H103

Regardless of how others think or act, I
intend to comply with the new
computer security policy.

Likert
Belief

Principal Investigator
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Appendix C – TPB Construct References
Table C1. Conceptual Definition of TPB Constructs (Bulgurcu et al., 2010)
Construct

Determinant

ISP Awareness

Antecedent

A construct structured as independent variables leading
to the dependent construct of IS Awareness.

General
Awareness

Antecedent

A construct structured as independent variables leading
to the dependent construct of IS Awareness.

Antecedent

A construct structured as independent variables leading
to dependent constructs within the Belief About
Outcome construct and dependent constructs within the
TPB model.

Beliefs About
Outcomes

Antecedent

Framework that encapsulates several constructs
structured as independent variables leading to
dependent constructs within the Belief About Overall
Assessment of Consequences construct.

Beliefs About
Overall
Assessment of
Consequences

Antecedent

Framework that encapsulates several constructs
structured as independent variables leading to
dependent constructs within the TPB model.

Attitude toward
compliance with
IS Policy

Independent

The degree to which the performance of the compliance
behavior is positively valued

Normative Beliefs

Independent

An employee’s perceived social pressure about
compliance with the requirements of the ISP caused by
behavioral expectations of such important referents as
executives, colleagues, and managers.

Self-Efficacy to
Comply

Independent

An employee’s judgment of personal skills, knowledge,
or competency about fulfilling the requirements of the
ISP.

Intention to
Comply

Dependent

An employee’s intention to protect the information and
technology resources of the organization from potential
security breaches

IS Awareness

Definition
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Table C2. Conceptual Definition of TPB Constructs (Dinev & Hu, 2007)
Construct

Determinant

Technology
Awareness

Antecedent

Definition
A construct structured as an independent variable
leading to a dependent variable within the TPB model.

Perceived
Usefulness

Antecedent

A construct structured as an independent variable
leading to a dependent variable within the TPB model.

Perceived Ease of
Use

Antecedent

A construct structured as an independent variable
leading to a dependent variable within the TPB model.

Antecedent

A construct structured as an independent variable
leading to a dependent variable within the TPB model.

Antecedent

A construct structured as an independent variable
leading to a dependent variable within the TPB model.

Self-Efficacy
Controllability
Attitude Toward
the Behavior

Independent

Refers to a person’s judgement about whether it is good
or bad to perform a behavior of interest.

Subjective Norm

Independent

A person’s perception of the social pressure to perform
or not perform the behavior in question.

Perceived
Behavioral
Control

Independent

The perceived ease or difficulty of performing a
behavior and a personal sense of control over one’s
performance.

Intention

Dependent

Intention to perform the behavior of interest.

Table C3. Conceptual Definition of TPB Constructs (Flores & Ekstedt, 2016)
Construct

Determinant

Definition

Organizational
Structure

Antecedent

Framework that encapsulates two constructs structured
as independent variables leading to dependent
construct of Information Security Awareness and to
dependent constructs within the TPB model.

Information
Security
Awareness

Antecedent

Framework that encapsulates several constructs
structured as independent variables leading to
dependent constructs within the TPB model.

Attitude

Independent

The degree to which the performance of the
information security behavior is positively valued.

Normative Belief

Independent

An employee’s perceived social pressure about his/her
social engineering security behavior caused by
behavioral expectations of such important referents as
executives, colleagues and managers.

Self-Efficacy

Independent

An employee’s judgment of personal skills, knowledge,
or competency about resisting social engineering.

Intention

Dependent

An employee’s intention to resist social engineering.
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Table C4. Conceptual Definition of TPB Constructs (Guo et al., 2011)
Construct

Determinant

Attitude Toward
Security Policy

Antecedent

A construct structured as an independent variable
leading to a dependent variable within the TPB model.

Utilitarian
Outcomes

Antecedent

Framework that encapsulates several constructs
structured as independent variables leading to
dependent constructs within the TPB model.

Attitude toward
NMSV

Independent

End users’ evaluation of security violations in terms of
their degree of favor or disfavor. Users who have a
positive attitude toward an NMSV would have a greater
intention to engage in such violations.

Normative
Outcome

Independent

The approval or disapproval that end users’ peers are
expected to express in relation to the behavior in
question.

Self-Identity
Outcome

Independent

Affirmations or repudiations of self-concept that are
anticipated to follow from engaging in a behavior.

Intention

Dependent

Definition

NMSV intentions are user tendencies to voluntarily
engage in actions that violate organizational security
policies. An indication of how much effort a user plans
to exert to perform the behavior.

Table C5. Conceptual Definition of TPB Constructs (Pavlou & Fygenson, 2006)
Construct

Determinant

Definition

External Beliefs
(getting info)

Antecedent

Framework that encapsulates several constructs
structured as independent variables leading to
dependent constructs within the TPB model.

External Beliefs
(purchasing)

Antecedent

Framework that encapsulates several constructs
structured as independent variables leading to
dependent constructs within the TPB model.

Attitude toward
Getting Info /
Purchasing

Independent

Attitude toward getting information about a product
from a vendor’s website in the next 30 days /
purchasing a product from a vendor’s web site in the
next 30 days.

Subjective Norm
on Getting Info /
Purchasing

Independent

Suggests that individual desire to act is based on the
perception of how significant others perceived an
individual’s actions.

Perceived
Behavioral
Control Getting
Info / Purchasing

Independent

An individual’s perception of how easy or how difficult it
is to carry out a behavior.

Intention

Dependent

An individual’s intention to perform a behavior.
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Table C6. Conceptual Definition of TPB Constructs (Song & Zahedi, 2005)
Construct

Determinant

Definition

Perceived
Existence of Web
Design Elements

Antecedent

Framework that encapsulates several constructs
structured as independent variables leading to
dependent constructs within the Belief About and
Evaluation / Motivation construct.

Belief About and
Evaluation /
Motivation

Antecedent

Framework that encapsulates several constructs
structured as independent variables leading to
dependent constructs within the TPB model.

Attitude

Independent

A web shopper’s attitude toward perceived price and
perceived service.

External
Subjective Norm

Independent

The social influences effecting the purchasing decisions
of a web shopper.

Perceived
Behavioral
Control

Independent

A web shopper’s beliefs regarding their ability to use an
online web site to complete a purchase.

Purchase
Intention

Dependent

The probability and willingness of a web shopper to
complete a purchase using online services.
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Appendix D – LISREL Notation
Table D1 – LISREL Elements (Hair, Black, Babin, & Anderson, 2010b)
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Table D2 – LISREL Element Pronunciation (Hair et al., 2010b)
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Appendix E – DSU IRB Exempt Project Approval
DSU Institutional Review Board

Exempt Project Approval
To:

Dennis Acuna

Date:

February 14, 2017

Project Title:

Effects of a Comprehensive Computer Security Policy on Human Computer Security
Policy Compliance

Approval #:

2016-2017-117

The IRB has determined that your project is exempt from the policy for the protection of human
subjects in research as described in 45 CFR 46.101 (b). The activity proposed in your protocol is
applicable to one of the category (categories) stated below:
(2) Research involving the use of educational tests (cognitive, diagnostic, aptitude,
achievement), survey procedures, interview procedures or observation of public behavior,
unless: (i) information obtained is recorded in such a manner that human subjects can be
identified, directly or through identifiers linked to the subjects; and (ii) any disclosure of the
human subjects' responses outside the research could reasonably place the subjects at risk of
criminal or civil liability or be damaging to the subjects' financial standing, employability, or
reputation.
If there are any unanticipated problems involving risks to subjects or others, or changes in the
procedures during the study, please contact irb@dsu.edu.
If I can be of further assistance, don’t hesitate to let me know.
Yours truly,

Dr. Jack Walters, Chair
DSU Institutional Review Board
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Appendix F – Composite Statistics by Research Hypotheses
An end user’s relationship beliefs about others in regard to avoiding NMSV behavior is positively associated with the intention
to comply with a comprehensive computer security policy.

H11

My coworkers agree
that I should comply
with this new policy.

Social
Identity (SI)

H12

My coworkers will think
that I should comply
with the new computer
security policy.

Social
Identity (SI)

H13

My supervisor will want
me to comply with this
new policy.

Social
Identity (SI)

H1

Figure F1 – Research Hypothesis H1

An end user’s conversations with others in regard to complying with a comprehensive computer security policy are positively
associated with the intention to comply with a comprehensive computer security policy.

H2

Resistance
(RE)

H21

It is important that I
convince my coworkers
to comply with the new
computer security
policy.

Resistance
(RE)

H22

My coworkers rely on
my opinion.

H23

This new policy is
important and others
need to know how I
feel about it.

Resistance
(RE)

Figure F2 – Research Hypothesis H2
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Penalties that emphasize the enterprise benefit and end user benefit of avoiding NMSV behavior are positively associated with
the intention to comply with a comprehensive computer security policy.

Sanctions
(PS)

H3

Sanctions
(PS)

Sanctions
(PS)

H31

I will be reprimanded if
my organization is
aware of my nonsecure actions.

H32

My management
notices when I follow
security procedures,
and encourages me to
keep doing a good job!

H33

I am encouraged when
the company notices I
am following security
procedures.

Figure F3 – Research Hypothesis H3

An end user’s relationship beliefs about others in regard to avoiding NMSV behavior enhances the normative belief to avoid
NMSV behavior and is positively associated with the intention to comply with a comprehensive computer security policy.

Normative
Beliefs (NB)

H4

Normative
Beliefs (NB)

Normative
Beliefs (NB)

H41

As an IT professional, I
have to do certain
things on my job.
Strictly following
computer security
policies is one of them.

H42

Following computer
security rules and
policies is an important
part of my work as an
IT professional.

H43

Breaking security
policies hurts my image
as a business
professional.

Figure F4 – Research Hypothesis H4
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An end user’s conversations with others in regard to complying with a comprehensive computer security policy enhances end
user attitude toward complying with a comprehensive computer security policy and are positively associated with the intention
to comply with a comprehensive computer security policy.

H5

Attitude
(AT)

H51

This security policy
helps to secure
information systems.

Attitude
(AT)

H52

This security policy is
absolutely necessary.

Attitude
(AT)

H53

This security policy is
important.

Figure F5 – Research Hypothesis H5

Penalties that emphasize the enterprise benefit and end user benefit of avoiding NMSV behavior enhance end user self-efficacy
toward complying with a comprehensive computer security policy and are positively associated with the intention to comply
with a comprehensive computer security policy.

Self-Efficacy
(SE)

H6

Self-Efficacy
(SE)

Self-Efficacy
(SE)

H61

I understand the risks
posed by poor security
and that I may be
reprimanded if I don’t
comply with policy.

H62

I am aware of the
potential threats and
negative consequences
that are possible if I
don’t follow the proper
security procedures.

H63

It is important that I
follow the rules for
keeping my
organization secure so
that I don’t get into
trouble.

Figure F6 – Research Hypothesis H6
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An end user’s normative beliefs toward a comprehensive computer security policy are positively associated with their intention
to comply with a comprehensive computer security policy.

Intent to
Comply (IN)

H7

Intent to
Comply (IN)

Intent to
Comply (IN)

H71

My co-workers and I
agree that complying
with the new policy is
the right thing to do.

H72

It is important to me
that my co-workers
comply with the new
policy.

H73

It is important that my
co-workers know that I
intend to comply with
the new computer
security policy.

Figure F7 – Research Hypothesis H7

An end user’s attitude toward a comprehensive computer security policy is positively associated with their intention to comply
with a comprehensive computer security policy.

Intent to
Comply (IN)

H8

Intent to
Comply (IN)

Intent to
Comply (IN)

H81

I believe that complying
with the new security
policy is a good idea.

H82

I think that complying
with the new security
policy is the right thing
to do.

H83

By complying with the
new security policy I am
helping the company
stay secure from
computer threats.

Figure F8 – Research Hypothesis H8
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An end user’s self-efficacy beliefs toward a comprehensive computer security policy are positively associated with their
intention to comply with a comprehensive computer security policy.

Intent to
Comply (IN)

H9

Intent to
Comply (IN)

Intent to
Comply (IN)

H91

Complying with the
new policy helps to
improve my job
performance.

H92

Complying with the
new policy lets me
perform my tasks more
effectively.

H93

Complying with the
new policy makes it
easier for me to do my
job.

Figure F9 – Research Hypothesis H9

An end user’s understanding of the enterprise benefits and personal benefits associated with a comprehensive computer
security policy positively affects their volitional control and intention to comply with a comprehensive computer security policy.

Computer
Security
Policy (CS)

H10

Computer
Security
Policy (CS)

Computer
Security
Policy (CS)

HA1

I am confident that I
will comply with the
new computer security
policy.

HA2

I understand the
benefits of the new
computer security
policy and I intend to
comply with it.

HA3

Regardless of how
others think or act, I
intend to comply with
the new computer
security policy.

Figure F10 – Research Hypothesis H10
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Appendix G – LISREL Standardized CFA Multi-Factor Model
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Appendix H – LISREL Unstandardized SEM Model
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Appendix I – Survey Operationalization
Q1 To the survey participant:
I am conducting a research study titled “Effects of a Comprehensive Computer Security Policy
on Human Computer Security Policy Compliance”, as part of a doctoral dissertation program at
Dakota State University (DSU).
The purpose of this study is to learn more about the theoretical factors that influence human
intent to comply with a computer security policy.
You are invited to participate in this study by completing the attached questionnaire. Your time
is valuable and I have attempted to keep this effort as brief as possible. Completing this
questionnaire should take no more than 30 minutes of your time.
Your participation in this study is voluntary. You may withdraw at any time without
consequence.
There are no known risks to you by participating in this study. While there are no known direct
benefits to you, there may be some indirect benefits by learning more about the factors
associated with a computer security policy.
Your questionnaire responses are strictly confidential. When the data and analysis are presented,
you will not be linked to the data by your name, title, electronic address or any other identifying
item.
Your consent to participate in this study is implied by the return of your completed
questionnaire.
Please keep this letter for your information. If you have any questions regarding your rights as a
participant in this study, you may contact the DSU Office of Sponsored Programs at (605)-2565100 or at irb@dsu.edu.
Thank you for your time and assistance.
Sincerely
Dennis Acuna
Principal Investigator
DSU Office of Sponsored Programs
(605)-256-5100
irb@dsu.edu
This project has been approved by the DSU Institutional Review Board, Approval #: 20162017-117
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 YES, I consent to participate in this study. (1)
 NO, I do not consent to participate in this study. (2)
Condition: NO, I do not consent to par... Is Selected. Skip To: End of Block.

Q2 During this study, you will be asked to select Information Technology (IT) or
Operational Technology (OT) as your authorized user identity, based on your
PRIMARY job function.
Information Technology (IT) Identity
You must be an authorized user at the place where you work. This means you have been given
credentials to access proprietary computer systems that are not available to the public.
You WORK PRIMARILY with information systems that are used to support general
organizational processes.Some examples of general organizational processes are accounting,
finance, procurement, marketing, human resources, and information technology, among others.
Examples of information systems you might work with include (but are not limited to):
Personal Computer (PC) based systems such as Microsoft Office (Word, Excel, PowerPoint,
Outlook, Internet Explorer) Systems that run on a mainframe computer Systems referred to as
cloud or web based systems Enterprise systems like SAP IT support systems such as database,
network, and application development
You DO NOT work in any way with industrial control systems (ICS), SCADA systems, or
manufacturing equipment such as PLCs.
Operational Technology (OT) Identity
You must be an authorized user at the place where you work. This means you have been given
credentials to access proprietary computer systems that are not available to the public.
You WORK PRIMARILY with industrial control systems (ICS), SCADA systems or
manufacturing equipment such as PLCs, which are used to control industrial processes by
monitoring and independently changing the state of a process.
Examples of industrial control systems you might work with include (but are not limited to):
Siemens Emerson Honeywell GE Rockwell
You might have access to information systems to monitor or record data, access email, or
browse the Internet, but this is not your primary work function. Examples of information
systems you might use in support of your job, but not the primary focus of your job, include:
Personal Computer (PC) based systems such as Microsoft Office (Word, Excel, PowerPoint,
Outlook, Internet Explorer) Systems that run on a mainframe computer Systems referred to as
cloud or web based systems Enterprise systems like SAP IT support systems such as database,
network, and programming tools
 YES, I wish to continue with this survey. (1)
 NO, I wish to exit this survey. (2)
Condition: NO, I wish to exit this sur... Is Selected. Skip To: End of Block.
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Q3 During this study, you will be asked to answer questions associated with a
comprehensive computer security policy.
For purpose of this study, a comprehensive computer security policy is defined as a top-level
enterprise policy combining all aspects of information technology (IT) computer security and
operational technology (OT) computer security, as opposed to focusing on only one or the
other.
The concept of merging all aspects of IT computer security which is focused on information
systems computer security, with all aspects of OT computer security which is focused on
industrial control systems computer security, is sometimes referred to as IT/OT convergence and
reflects a comprehensive or holistic approach to managing computer security. This differs from
the traditional definition of a computer security policy that only includes aspects of computer
security from the IT domain, as this definition also includes aspects of computer security from
the OT domain.
The intent behind managing computer security from a comprehensive perspective is to minimize
the non-malicious computer security actions of all authorized users across the enterprise, as
opposed to focusing on only one domain or the other.
As such, a comprehensive computer security policy gathers all aspects of computer security into
a single, overarching policy that binds all authorized users in the enterprise to a common cause;
being accountable for their computer security actions regardless of whether or not an authorized
user identifies as IT or OT.
 YES, I wish to continue with this survey. (1)
 NO, I wish to exit this survey. (2)
Condition: NO, I wish to exit this sur... Is Selected. Skip To: End of Block.

Q4 Beginning of survey.
There are 36 questions in this survey, numbered 0 through 35.
For purpose of this survey, imagine that a comprehensive computer security policy has been
implemented at your place of work. Please answer each question from your perspective as either
an Information Technology (IT) authorized user or an Operational Technology (OT) authorized
user.
Click the forward button after answering each question, to move to the next page.
Click the back button if you wish to review the previous page.
 YES, I wish to continue with this survey. (1)
 NO, I wish to exit this survey. (2)
Condition: NO, I wish to exit this sur... Is Selected. Skip To: End of Block.
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Q5 Question 0
As an authorized user, I identify myself as:
 Information Technology (IT) identity (I work primarily with information systems that
support general organizational processes) (1)
 Operational Technology (OT) identity (I work primarily with industrial control systems,
SCADA systems, PLCs, etc.) (2)
 I am not an authorized user (3)
Condition: I am not an authorized user Is Selected. Skip To: End of Block.

Q6 Question 1
Strongly
Disagree
(1)

My
coworkers
agree that
I should
comply
with the
new
policy. (1)



Disagree
(2)



Somewhat
Disagree
(3)



Neither
Agree nor
Disagree
(4)



Somewhat
Agree (5)



Agree (6)



Strongly
agree (7)



Q7 Question 2
Strongly
Disagree
(1)

My
coworkers
will think
that I
should
comply
with the
new
computer
security
policy. (1)



Disagree
(2)



Somewhat
Disagree
(3)
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Neither
Agree nor
Disagree
(4)



Somewhat
Agree (5)



Agree (6)



Strongly
agree (7)
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Q8 Question 3
Strongly
Disagree
(1)

My
supervisor
will want
me to
comply
with this
new
policy. (1)

Disagree
(2)

Somewhat
Disagree
(3)

Neither
Agree nor
Disagree
(4)

Somewhat
Agree (5)











Strongly
Disagree
(1)

Disagree
(2)

Somewhat
Disagree
(3)

Neither
Agree nor
Disagree
(4)

Somewhat
Agree (5)

Agree (6)



Strongly
agree (7)



Q9 Question 4

It is
important
that I
convince
my
coworkers
to comply
with the
new
computer
security
policy. (1)
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Agree (6)



Strongly
agree (7)
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Q10 Question 5
Strongly
Disagree
(1)

My
coworkers
rely on
my
opinion.
(1)



Disagree
(2)

Somewhat
Disagree
(3)

Neither
Agree nor
Disagree
(4)

Somewhat
Agree (5)

Agree (6)

Strongly
agree (7)













Disagree
(2)

Somewhat
Disagree
(3)

Neither
Agree nor
Disagree
(4)

Somewhat
Agree (5)

Agree (6)

Strongly
agree (7)

Q11 Question 6
Strongly
Disagree
(1)

The new
policy is
important
and
others
need to
know
how I feel
about it.
(1)
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Q12 Question 7
Strongly
Disagree
(1)

I will be
reprimanded
if my
organization
is aware of
my nonsecure
actions. (1)



Disagree
(2)



Somewhat
Disagree
(3)



Neither
Agree nor
Disagree
(4)



Somewhat
Agree (5)



Agree (6)



Strongly
agree (7)



Q13 Question 8
Strongly
Disagree
(1)

My
management
notices
when I
follow
security
procedures,
and
encourages
me to keep
doing a good
job! (1)



Disagree
(2)



Somewhat
Disagree
(3)
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Neither
Agree nor
Disagree
(4)



Somewhat
Agree (5)



Agree (6)



Strongly
agree (7)
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Q14 Question 9
Strongly
Disagree
(1)

I am
encouraged
when the
company
notices I
am
following
security
procedures.
(1)



Disagree
(2)



Somewhat
Disagree
(3)



Neither
Agree nor
Disagree
(4)



Somewhat
Agree (5)



Agree (6)



Strongly
agree (7)



Q15 Question 10
Strongly
Disagree
(1)

As a
professional,
I have to do
certain
things on
my job.
Strictly
following
computer
security
policies is
one of
them. (1)



Disagree
(2)



Somewhat
Disagree
(3)
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Neither
Agree nor
Disagree
(4)



Somewhat
Agree (5)



Agree (6)



Strongly
agree (7)
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Q16 Question 11
Strongly
Disagree
(1)

Following
computer
security
rules and
policies is an
important
part of what
do as a
professional.
(1)



Disagree
(2)



Somewhat
Disagree
(3)



Neither
Agree nor
Disagree
(4)



Somewhat
Agree (5)



Agree (6)



Strongly
agree (7)



Q17 Question 12
Strongly
Disagree
(1)

Breaking
security
policies
hurts my
image as a
professional.
(1)



Disagree
(2)



Somewhat
Disagree
(3)
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Neither
Agree nor
Disagree
(4)



Somewhat
Agree (5)



Agree (6)



Strongly
agree (7)
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Q18 Question 13
Strongly
Disagree
(1)

This
security
policy
helps to
secure all
computer
systems.
(1)



Disagree
(2)



Somewhat
Disagree
(3)



Neither
Agree nor
Disagree
(4)



Somewhat
Agree (5)



Agree (6)



Strongly
agree (7)



Q19 Question 14
Strongly
Disagree
(1)

This
security
policy is
absolutely
necessary.
(1)



Disagree
(2)



Somewhat
Disagree
(3)



Neither
Agree nor
Disagree
(4)



Somewhat
Agree (5)



Agree (6)



Strongly
agree (7)



Q20 Question 15
Strongly
Disagree
(1)

This
security
policy is
important.
(1)



Disagree
(2)



Somewhat
Disagree
(3)
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Neither
Agree nor
Disagree
(4)



Somewhat
Agree (5)



Agree (6)



Strongly
agree (7)
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Q21 Question 16
Strongly
Disagree
(1)

I understand
the risks
posed by
poor
security and
that I may
be
reprimanded
if I don't
comply with
policy. (1)



Disagree
(2)



Somewhat
Disagree
(3)



Neither
Agree nor
Disagree
(4)



Somewhat
Agree (5)



Agree (6)



Strongly
agree (7)



Q22 Question 17
Strongly
Disagree
(1)

I am aware of
the potential
threats and
negative
consequences
that are
possible if I
don't follow
the proper
security
procedures.
(1)



Disagree
(2)



Somewhat
Disagree
(3)
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Neither
Agree nor
Disagree
(4)



Somewhat
Agree (5)



Agree (6)



Strongly
agree (7)
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Q23 Question 18
Strongly
Disagree
(1)

It is
important
that I follow
the rules for
keeping my
organization
secure so
that I don't
get into
trouble. (1)



Disagree
(2)



Somewhat
Disagree
(3)



Neither
Agree nor
Disagree
(4)



Somewhat
Agree (5)

Agree (6)

Strongly
agree (7)







Somewhat
Agree (5)

Agree (6)

Strongly
agree (7)

Q24 Question 19
Strongly
Disagree
(1)

My coworkers
and I
agree
that
complying
with the
new
policy is
the right
thing to
do. (1)



Disagree
(2)



Somewhat
Disagree
(3)



doctoral dissertation final defense ACUNA v5.3

Neither
Agree nor
Disagree
(4)
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Q25 Question 20
Strongly
Disagree
(1)

It is
important
to me
that my
coworkers
comply
with the
new
policy. (1)



Disagree
(2)



Somewhat
Disagree
(3)



Neither
Agree nor
Disagree
(4)



Somewhat
Agree (5)



Agree (6)



Strongly
agree (7)



Q26 Question 21
Strongly
Disagree
(1)

It is
important
that my
coworkers
know
that I
intend to
comply
with the
new
computer
security
policy. (1)



Disagree
(2)



Somewhat
Disagree
(3)
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Neither
Agree nor
Disagree
(4)



Somewhat
Agree (5)



Agree (6)



Strongly
agree (7)
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Q27 Question 22
Strongly
Disagree
(1)

I believe
that
complying
with the
new
security
policy is a
good
idea. (1)



Disagree
(2)



Somewhat
Disagree
(3)



Neither
Agree nor
Disagree
(4)



Somewhat
Agree (5)



Agree (6)



Strongly
agree (7)



Q28 Question 23
Strongly
Disagree
(1)

I think
that
complying
with the
new
security
policy is
the right
thing to
do. (1)



Disagree
(2)



Somewhat
Disagree
(3)



doctoral dissertation final defense ACUNA v5.3

Neither
Agree nor
Disagree
(4)



Somewhat
Agree (5)



Agree (6)



Strongly
agree (7)
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Q29 Question 24
Strongly
Disagree
(1)

By
complying
with the
new
security
policy I
am
helping
the
company
stay
secure
from
computer
threats.
(1)



Disagree
(2)



Somewhat
Disagree
(3)



Neither
Agree nor
Disagree
(4)



Somewhat
Agree (5)



Agree (6)



Strongly
agree (7)



Q30 Question 25
Strongly
Disagree
(1)

Complying
with the new
policy helps
to improve
my job
performance.
(1)



Disagree
(2)



Somewhat
Disagree
(3)
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Neither
Agree nor
Disagree
(4)



Somewhat
Agree (5)



Agree (6)



Strongly
agree (7)
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Q31 Question 26
Strongly
Disagree
(1)

Complying
with the
new policy
lets me
perform
my tasks
more
effectively.
(1)



Disagree
(2)

Somewhat
Disagree
(3)

Neither
Agree nor
Disagree
(4)

Somewhat
Agree (5)

Agree (6)

Strongly
agree (7)













Disagree
(2)

Somewhat
Disagree
(3)

Neither
Agree nor
Disagree
(4)

Somewhat
Agree (5)

Agree (6)

Strongly
agree (7)

Q32 Question 27
Strongly
Disagree
(1)

Complying
with the
new
policy
makes it
easier for
me to do
my job.
(1)
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Q33 Question 28
Strongly
Disagree
(1)

I am
confident
that I will
comply
with the
new
computer
security
policy. (1)



Disagree
(2)



Somewhat
Disagree
(3)



Neither
Agree nor
Disagree
(4)



Somewhat
Agree (5)



Agree (6)



Strongly
agree (7)



Q34 Question 29
Strongly
Disagree
(1)

I
understand
the
benefits of
the new
computer
security
policy and I
intend to
comply
with it. (1)



Disagree
(2)



Somewhat
Disagree
(3)
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Neither
Agree nor
Disagree
(4)



Somewhat
Agree (5)



Agree (6)



Strongly
agree (7)
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Q35 Question 30
Strongly
Disagree
(1)

Regardless
of how
others
think or
act, I
intend to
comply
with the
new
computer
security
policy. (1)



Disagree
(2)



Somewhat
Disagree
(3)



Neither
Agree nor
Disagree
(4)



Somewhat
Agree (5)



Agree (6)



Strongly
agree (7)



Q36 Question 31
My age (round to nearest year):
 Less than 18 years old (1)
 18 to 24 years old (2)
 25 to 34 years old (3)
 35 to 44 years old (4)
 45 to 54 years old (5)
 55 to 64 years old (6)
 65 years or older (7)
Q37 Question 32
My gender:
 Male (1)
 Female (2)
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Q38 Question 33
The highest level of education that I have completed:
 Some high school, but no diploma (1)
 High school diploma or equivalent (GED) (2)
 Some college credit, but no degree (3)
 Trade/technical/vocational certificate (4)
 Associate's degree (5)
 Bachelor's degree (6)
 Some graduate school work, but no graduate degree (7)
 Master's degree (8)
 Doctorate degree (9)
Q39 Question 34
My total years of experience as an authorized user (round to closest year, regardless of IT/OT
identity):
 Less than 1 year (1)
 1 to 5 years (2)
 6 to 10 years (3)
 11 to 15 years (4)
 16 to 20 years (5)
 21 to 25 years (6)
 26 to 30 years (7)
 31 to 35 years (8)
 36 years or more (9)
Q40 Question 35
The industry sector that I currently work in:
 Extraction of natural resources (e.g. agriculture, forestry, fishing, mining, drilling, etc.) (1)
 Transformation of natural resources (e.g. manufacturing, construction, energy, refining, etc.)
(2)
 Physical service provider (e.g. transportation, distribution, wholesale, retail, government,
etc.) (3)
 Knowledge based service provider (e.g. information technology, education, media,
consulting, etc.) (4)
Q41 End of survey.
Thank you for your participation!
Please press the forward button to complete this survey.
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